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Report of the Economic and Social Council

Programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009

Revised estimates resulting from resolutions and decisions adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2008

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report details budgetary requirements resulting from resolutions and decisions adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2008. The additional expenditure requirements arising as a result of those resolutions and decisions are estimated at $420,500 under the regular budget, all of which could be absorbed within the resources provided under the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009. The requirements for the biennium 2010-2011 will be considered within the context of the proposed programme budget for that biennium.

The decisions adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2008 also entail modifications to the programme of work under sections 16 and 18 resulting from decisions of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which are contained in the present report for approval by the General Assembly at its sixty-third session.

08-51682 (E) 131008

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted to inform the General Assembly of the requirements resulting from resolutions and decisions adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2008.

2. The Council adopted a number of resolutions and decisions in which it authorized relevant functional commissions, standing committees or expert bodies to undertake additional activities, including meetings, for which no provisions had been made in the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009[1] and which would have an impact on the estimates of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011. In accordance with rule 31 of its rules of procedure, the Council was provided, where appropriate, with a statement of programme budget implications prior to the adoption of those resolutions and decisions. The additional requirements entailed by the Council's resolutions and decisions are described below.

3. In its report on the revised estimates resulting from resolutions and decisions adopted by the Council at its substantive session of 1999 (A/54/7/Add.2), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions requested that future reports on the subject contain full cost estimates, including both conference and non-conference costs, of additional requirements. In response to that request, the additional requirements resulting from the resolutions and decisions adopted by the Council in 2008 to be financed from the existing provisions of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, and those of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011, are indicated in the annex to the present report.

4. The decisions adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2008 also entail modifications to the programme of work under sections 16 and 18 resulting from decisions of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which are contained in the present report for approval by the General Assembly at its sixty-third session.

II. Additional requirements and modifications to the programme of work entailed by resolutions and decisions adopted by the Economic and Social Council

A. Resolution 2008/10: Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti

5. Under the terms of operative paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of its resolution 2008/10, the Council:

(a) Decided to extend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti until the substantive session of the Economic and Social Council in July 2009, with

[1] The proposed programme budget is contained in documents A/62/6 (Introduction) and Corr.1, (Sects. 1-3), (Sect. 4) and Corr.1, (Sects. 5-7), (Sect. 8) and Corr.1, (Sects. 9-11), (Sect. 12) and Corr.1, (Sects. 13-18), (Sect. 19) and Corr.1, (Sects. 20-22), (Sect. 23) and Corr.1, (Sect. 24) and Corr.1, (Sects. 25-27), (Sect. 28), (Sect. 28A) and Corr.1, (Sect. 28B) and Corr.1, (Sect. 28C) and Corr.1, (Sect. 28D), (Sect. 28E) and Corr.1 and 2, (Sects. 28F and G), (Sect. 29) and Corr.1, (Sects. 30-35) and (Income sects. 1-3).

the purpose of following closely and providing advice on Haiti's long-term development strategy to promote socio-economic recovery and stability, with particular attention to the need to ensure coherence and sustainability in international support for Haiti, based on the long-term national development priorities and building upon the Interim Cooperation Framework and the growth and poverty reduction strategy paper, and stressing the need to avoid overlap and duplication with respect to existing mechanisms;

(b) Expressed its satisfaction to the Secretary-General for the support provided to the Ad Hoc Advisory Group, and requested him to continue to support the Group's activities adequately from within existing resources;

(c) Requested the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti to submit a report on its work, with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2009.

6. It is estimated that the support to be provided to the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti would consist of travel, daily subsistence allowance and terminal expenses for four members of the Group and one staff member of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat to undertake a mission to Haiti in April 2009. The resource requirements for undertaking the consultation mission are estimated at $13,500 and would provide for travel, daily subsistence allowance and terminal expenses ($11,500 for four members of the Group and $2,000 for one staff member of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs), for which the funds had not been provided in the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

7. In this connection, in his report on the revised estimates resulting from resolutions and decisions adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its substantive and resumed substantive sessions of 2007 (A/62/515) which contained similar requests, the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly that all efforts would be made to meet the estimated requirements of $13,500 under section 9, Economic and social affairs of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, together with extrabudgetary funds. The meeting in April 2008 was cancelled. It is proposed that all possible efforts be made to meet the requirements of $13,500 for 2009, under section 9, Economic and social affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, together with extrabudgetary funds. Accordingly, no additional appropriation is required nor sought from the General Assembly in regard to the resolution.

B. Decision 2008/234: documents considered by the Economic and Social Council in connection with regional cooperation: (a) report of the Secretary-General on regional cooperation in the economic, social and related fields (E/2008/15/Add.1 and Add.2)

8. Section I.A. of the report of the Secretary-General on regional cooperation in the economic, social and related fields: matters calling for action by the Economic and Social Council or brought to its attention (E/2008/15/Add.1), contains a draft resolution approved by ESCAP for adoption by the Economic and Social Council, by which the Council would:

(a) Endorse the resolution on the restructuring of the conference structure of ESCAP as set out in annex I to the resolution;

(b) Also endorse the annexes to the resolution on the conference structure of the Commission; on issues to be addressed by the committees subsidiary to the Commission; and on the terms of reference of the Advisory Committee of Permanent Representatives and Other Representatives Designated by Members of the Commission, as set out in annexes II, III and IV to the resolution.

9. In section II.B. of the report, the attention of the Council is drawn to the nine resolutions (64/2 through 64/10), adopted by ESCAP at its sixty-fourth session.

10. In paragraph (a) of its decision 2008/234, the Economic and Social Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General (E/2008/15/Add.1 and Add.2).

11. With regard to paragraph 9, the Secretariat brought to the attention of the Council the fact that it had informed ESCAP that the implementation of the requests in the draft resolution would require modifications of the approved programme of work for the biennium 2008-2009 at the level of planned outputs in the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 (A/62/6 (Sect. 18)). The Council was further informed that, by endorsing the Commission's resolution, it would endorse the modifications in the 2008-2009 programme budget, which are outlined in paragraph 15 below.

12. The attention of the Economic and Social Council was also drawn to annex I to the report of the Commission (E/2008/39) which contained a statement of programme budget implications relating to the above-mentioned resolutions 64/2 to 64/10 adopted by ESCAP, as well as to resolution 64/1 on the restructuring of the conference structure of the Commission. It is confirmed that the statement remains valid, the requests contained in the resolution do not entail any additional appropriation for the biennium 2008-2009 from the regular budget and that extrabudgetary resources, where appropriate, will be sought for the implementation of the activities required under the aforementioned ESCAP resolutions.

13. Pursuant to ESCAP resolution 64/1, the Commission decided to revise its conference structure, with immediate effect, to conform to the pattern outlined in annex I to the resolution. To this effect and under the terms of operative paragraphs 2 to 7 of the resolution, the Commission requested the Executive Secretary:

(a) To take into account the revision of the intergovernmental structure subsidiary to the Commission in the future programme of work and strategic framework of the organization;

(b) Bearing in mind the goal of maximizing the impact of the United Nations in the field of economic and social development in the Asian and Pacific region, to reorganize the secretariat so as to enhance its capability to service the subsidiary structure of the Commission;

(c) To provide members and associate members with a preliminary assessment of the organizational and staffing implications of the revision of the intergovernmental structure subsidiary to the Commission within the next six months;

(d) To continue efforts to monitor closely the strict implementation, as applicable to ESCAP, of General Assembly resolution 61/266;

(e) To undertake systematic monitoring and evaluation of the conference structure and its link to the programme priorities of the Commission;

(f) To report to the Commission at its sixty-seventh session on the implementation of the resolution, focusing in particular on whether the conference structure had served the purpose of improving efficiency and attracting higher and wider representation from members and associate members, which would serve as the basis for a mid-term review of the effective functioning of the conference structure to be conducted during the sixty-seventh session;

14. The requests contained in ESCAP resolution 64/1 fall under the overall programme of work of ESCAP and are consistent with the approved biennial programme plan and priorities for the period 2008-2009 (A/61/6/Rev.1 (Prog. 15)) and with the proposed strategic framework for the period 2010-2011 (A/63/6 (Prog. 15)), which was reviewed by the Committee for Programme and Coordination at its forty-eighth session held at United Nations Headquarters in June 2008, and is scheduled to be reviewed by the General Assembly at its sixty-third session.

15. Implementation of the requests contained in the resolution would require modifications of the approved programme of work for the biennium 2008-2009 at the level of planned outputs in the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 (A/62/6 (Sect. 18)), as reflected below. The number of outputs would be adjusted depending on the periodicity and length of the meetings of the commission and its subsidiary bodies referred to below.

(a) Executive direction and management:

Paragraph 18.33

(a) (i) a. Substantive servicing of meetings: (The number of sessions of ESCAP would be adjusted);

(a) (ii) a. Substantive servicing of meetings: (The number of plenary meetings of the Special Body on Least Developed and Landlocked Developing Countries would be adjusted);

(a) b. The words "Parliamentary documentation: report of the Special Body on Least Developed and Landlocked Developing Countries" would be deleted (the report would be included in the report of the Commission);

(b) Subprogramme 1. Poverty and development:

Paragraph 18.37

(a) (ii) The words "Committee on Poverty Reduction" would be replaced with the words "Committee on Macroeconomic Policy, Poverty Reduction and Inclusive Development";

(c) Subprogramme 2. Statistics:

Paragraph 18.43

(a) (ii) The words "Committee on Poverty Reduction" would be replaced with "Committee on Statistics";

(a) (ii) b. The words "Report of the Committee of Statistics (1)" would be inserted after the words "reports on issues related to poverty statistics";

(d) Subprogramme 3. Development of Pacific island countries and territories:

Paragraph 18.48

(a) (iii) The words "Committee on Poverty Reduction" would be replaced with "Committee on Macroeconomic Policy, Poverty Reduction and Inclusive Development";

(e) Subprogramme 4. Trade and investment:

Paragraph 18.53

(a) (ii) The words "Committee on Managing Globalization (Part I)" would be replaced with "Committee on Trade and Investment";

(a) (ii) b. The words "report of the Committee on Trade and Investment" would be inserted after the words "reports on issues related to trade and investment";

(f) Subprogramme 5. Transport and tourism:

Paragraph 18.58

(a) (ii) The words "Committee on Managing Globalization" would be replaced with "Committee on Transport";

(a) The following text, "(iii) Forum of Asian Ministers of Transport."

"a. Substantive servicing of meetings: first session (2009)" would be inserted and the succeeding paragraphs under paragraph 18.58 (a) would be renumbered accordingly;

(g) Subprogramme 6. Environment and sustainable development:

Paragraph 18.63

(a) (ii) The words "Committee on Managing Globalization (Part II)" would be replaced with "Committee on Environment and Development";

(h) Subprogramme 7. Information, communication and space technology:

Paragraph 18.70

(a) (ii) The words "Committee on Managing Globalization (Part II)" would be replaced with "Committee on Information, Communication and Space Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction";

(a) (ii) b. The words "report of the Committee on Information, Communication and Space Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction" would be inserted after the words "reports related to cross-cutting issues on information, communication and space technology";

(i) Subprogramme 8. Social development, including persistent and emerging issues:

Paragraph 18.75

(a) (ii) The words "Committee on Emerging Social Issues" would be replaced with "Committee on Social Development".

C. Decision 2008/245: Report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on its seventeenth session and provisional agenda and documentation for its eighteenth session

16. In its decision 2008/245, the Economic and Social Council took note of the report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on its seventeenth session and approved the provisional agenda and documentation for its eighteenth session.

17. In accordance with rule 31 of the rules of procedure of the Economic and Social Council, at the time of adoption of its decision 2008/245, the Council was informed that, in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council, oral statements of programme budget implications had been provided to the Commission at the time of its adoption of the draft resolutions and decisions, which are contained in annexes II to IV to the report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (E/2008/30).

18. The Secretariat confirms that the statements of programme budget implications annexed to the report of the Commission (E/2008/30) remain valid; hence the resolutions and decisions do not entail any additional appropriation for the biennium 2008-2009. However, additional extrabudgetary resources would be required for their implementation, as referred to in annexes III to V. The Commission was also informed, as reflected in the programme budget implication statement in annex VI of its report (E/2008/30), that to facilitate the work of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on conference-servicing would be provided on an "as available" basis and would require the approval of the Committee on Conferences of the General Assembly.

D. Decision 2008/247: Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its fifty-first session and provisional agenda and documentation for the fifty-second session of the Commission

19. In its decision 2008/247, the Economic and Social Council took note of the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its fifty-first session and approved the provisional agenda and documentation for the fifty-second session of the Commission.

20. In accordance with rule 31 of the rules of procedure of the Economic and Social Council, at the time of adoption of its decision 2008/247, the Council was informed that, in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council, oral statements of programme budget implications were provided to the Commission at the time of its adoption of the draft resolutions and decisions, which are contained in annexes II to VII to the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its fifty-fifth session (E/2008/28).

21. The Council was also informed that, at the time of adoption of resolution 51/4 by the Commission, the Secretariat brought to the attention of the Commission the fact that the implementation of the requests contained in the draft resolution would require modifications of the approved programme of work, at the level of planned outputs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 (A/62/6 (Sect. 16)), as follows:

Subprogramme 2. Services for policymaking and treaty adherence:

Paragraph 16.44 (a)

(a) A new subparagraph, which would read, "(viii) Ad hoc expert groups: drug demand reduction (2); supply reduction (manufacture and trafficking) (2); countering money-laundering and promoting judicial cooperation (2); international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development (2); control of precursors and of amphetamine-type stimulants (2)" would be inserted;

(b) The succeeding paragraphs would be renumbered accordingly.

22. Accordingly, the Council, by taking note of the Commission's resolution, endorsed the modifications in the 2008-2009 programme budget.

23. The attention of the General Assembly is drawn to annexes II to VII to the report of the Commission (E/2008/28), which contain the respective statements of financial implications of its resolutions and decisions. It is confirmed that these statements remain valid and do not entail any additional appropriation for the biennium 2008-2009. It is envisaged that additional extrabudgetary resources would be required for the implementation of the activities referred to in annexes II to V. Conference-servicing would be provided on an "as available" basis and would require the approval of the Committee on Conferences of the General Assembly with respect to resolution 51/4, referred to in annex VII.

E. Decisions 2008/249 and 2008/250: international expert group meeting on the implementation of article 42 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; venue and dates of the eighth session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

24. In its decisions 2008/249 and 2008/250, the Economic and Social Council decided: (a) to authorize a three-day international expert group meeting on the implementation of article 42 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and requested that the results of the meeting be reported to the Permanent Forum at its eighth session; and (b) that the eighth session of the Permanent Forum would be held at United Nations Headquarters from 18 to 29 May 2009. In accordance with rule 31 of the rules of procedure of the Economic and

Social Council, the Council was informed of the programme budget implications of its decisions in an oral statement by the Secretariat.

25. As regards decision 2008/249, it is understood that the intention of the Forum is to decide on the priority theme of one of the two expert group meetings, as currently programmed under subprogramme 3, Social policy and development of section 9, Economic and social affairs of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009. Therefore, no changes in the programme narrative of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 are required, nor are additional resources required for implementation of this activity.

26. As regards decision 2008/250, the related dates of 18 to 29 May 2009 will be reflected in the 2009 calendar of conferences and meetings of the United Nations. No additional programmatic and budgetary implications are envisaged in this regard.

27. The Forum also adopted a number of recommendations, which are contained in the report on its seventh session (E/2008/43), two of which are referred to in paragraph 29 below, that may entail programme budget implications for various entities of the United Nations system. The attention of the Forum was drawn, in this connection, to paragraph 1 (b) of General Assembly resolution 57/191, in which the Assembly requested the establishment of a voluntary fund for the Forum for the purpose of funding the implementation of recommendations made by the Forum through the Economic and Social Council, in line with paragraph 2 (a) of Council resolution 2000/22, as well as funding activities under its mandate, as defined in paragraphs 2 (b) and (c) of the same resolution. Therefore, it is expected that the funding of the implementation of recommendations made by the Forum would be met through voluntary contributions.

28. Paragraphs 22 and 118 of document E/2008/43 provide for the appointment of special rapporteurs of the Forum to prepare various studies. It is recalled that, in accordance with established practice, the special rapporteurs appointed by the Forum provide their services at no cost to the Organization and results of their work are disseminated through postings on the Department of Economic and Social Affairs website and therefore entail no additional financial requirements.

29. There are no programme budget implications resulting from the other recommendations contained in document E/2008/43.

30. In summary, the decisions and recommendations of the Forum, contained in documents E/2008/43, do not entail financial implications for the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009.

III. Overall requirements

31. The implications of resolutions and decisions adopted by the Council at its substantive session of 2008 would give rise to additional requirements of $420,500 for the biennium 2008-2009, as shown in the table below and in the annex, all of which can be absorbed within the relevant sections of the approved appropriations for the biennium 2008-2009. Moreover, additional extrabudgetary resources will be sought for the implementation of a number of the resolutions. For the biennium 2010-2011, the requirements will be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011.

Additional requirements for the bienniums 2008-2009 and 2010-2011

(United States dollars)

	2008-2009
Section 2. General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management	407 000
Section 9. Economic and social affairs	13 500
Section 16. International drug control, crime and terrorism prevention and criminal justice	—
Section 18. Economic and social development in Asia and the Pacific	—
Total	**420 500**

IV. Recommendation

32. **In summary, the implications of resolutions and decisions adopted by the Council at its substantive session of 2008 would give rise to additional requirements which will be absorbed in the relevant sections of the appropriation for the biennium 2008-2009, as follows for the biennium 2008-2009, totalling $420,500; under: (a) section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management ($407,000); and (b) section 9, Economic and social affairs ($13,500). For the biennium 2010-2011, these requirements will be sought in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011.**

33. **Additional appropriations are not sought over and above the level of funding approved in the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 under sections 2, 9, 16 and 18. Should the actual requirements exceed the absorptive capacity of the aforementioned sections, the additional provisions would be reported in the context of the second performance report for the biennium 2008-2009. Extrabudgetary funds are also expected to cover the need for supplementary resources that have been identified in the biennium 2008-2009.**

Annex

Summary of requirements resulting from resolutions and decisions of the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2008

			2008-2009
		Budget section	*Requirements for expenditure[a] (to be absorbed)*
Economic and Social Council resolutions			
2008/10	Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti	9	13 500
Economic and Social Council decisions			
2008/234	Documents considered by the Economic and Social Council in connection with regional cooperation: (a) Report of the Secretary-General on regional cooperation in the economic, social and related fields	18	[a]
2008/245	Report of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on its seventeenth session and provisional agenda and documentation for its eighteenth session	2 16	[a]
2008/247	Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its fifty-first session and provisional agenda and documentation for the fifty-second session of the Commission	2 16	407 000 [a]
2008/249 and 2008/250	International expert group meeting on indigenous languages and venue and dates of the eighth session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues	2 9 23	— [a] —[b]
Total			**420 500**

[a] All requirements for expenditure are to be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2008-2009.
[b] Resources required will be provided from extrabudgetary resources.

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The situation in Afghanistan

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The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report provides an update on developments in Afghanistan since the previous report of the Secretary-General, of 6 March 2008 (A/62/722-S/2008/159). The situation has become more challenging since March. The Secretary-General draws attention to the increase in attacks by anti-Government elements and their use of asymmetric tactics. Preparations for the voter registration process have progressed, as have counter-narcotics efforts, with a decrease being noted in opium cultivation and production. Particular attention is devoted to the increase in the number of civilian casualties, which are caused mainly by anti-Government activities but are also the unintended consequence of operations by pro-Government forces. The Secretary-General's assessment is that the humanitarian situation is worsening, and he emphasizes the seriousness of food insecurity in Afghanistan. Further, he describes reforms of the decision-making process of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and developments in the field of gender, governance and mine action. The operations of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan are described and observations set out regarding priorities for the Government of Afghanistan, the international community and the Mission over the coming months.

08-51179 (E) 260908

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 62/6 and Security Council resolution 1806 (2008), by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 23 March 2009. The report reviews the situation in Afghanistan and the activities of UNAMA since my previous report on the situation in that country and its implications for international peace and security, dated 6 March 2008 (A/62/722-S/2008/159), and my special report, dated 3 July 2008 (S/2008/434). The Council also received oral briefings on the situation in Afghanistan on 12 March 2008, on the outcome of the Paris Conference in Support of Afghanistan on 10 July 2008 and on the civilian casualties in Shindand on 26 August 2008.

II. Overview

2. The overall situation in Afghanistan has become more challenging since my previous report. Despite the enhanced capabilities of both the Afghan National Army and the international forces, the security situation has deteriorated markedly. The influence of the insurgency has expanded beyond traditionally volatile areas and has increased in provinces neighbouring Kabul. Incidents stemming from cross-border activities from Pakistan have increased significantly in terms of numbers and sophistication. The insurgency's dependence on asymmetric tactics has also led to a sharp rise in the number of civilian casualties. Civilians are also being killed as a result of military operations carried out by Afghan and international security forces, in particular in situations in which insurgents conceal themselves in populated areas. Another worrying development is the fact that attacks on aid-related targets and non-governmental organizations have become more frequent and more deadly.

3. The humanitarian situation has also deteriorated, in part owing to the ongoing conflict and in part as a result of a coincidence of crises. The most pressing humanitarian problem is that drought and high global food prices have created food shortages affecting one sixth of the country's population. The situation calls for urgent action with both a short-term and a longer-term perspective.

4. Nonetheless, there have been positive developments during the period under review. As described in greater detail in my special report (S/2008/434), the Paris Conference in Support of Afghanistan, which was held on 12 June 2008, launched the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. That document, together with the Paris Declaration, established a road map for future efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to provide for the security and prosperity of the Afghan people. Participants in the Conference underscored their commitment to the road map by pledging $21.4 billion for the development of Afghanistan. Implementation of the Development Strategy and the Paris Declaration has begun. If the funds pledged are to have the impact required, massive institution-building efforts will be necessary, along with determination to improve the quality of governance. On the side of the international community, greater coordination and coherence of assistance programmes remain indispensable.

5. Another positive development was the increase in the number of poppy-free provinces from 13 to 18, as reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its latest survey of opium production. The Office also reported that the

overall area of poppy cultivation had decreased by 19 per cent, which had translated into a reduction in production volume of 6 per cent (unfortunately, greater yields decreased the effect of the reduction in cultivation area). Most cultivation is now concentrated in a few provinces, of which Helmand is the most significant. Eradication was modest compared with the targets set for 2008, and the cost of eradication in terms of loss of life was high. Revenues from the illegal opium economy continue to finance the insurgency.

6. Given that the situation has clearly become more challenging during the past few months, I would like to underline the consensus reached at the Paris Conference: decisive action must be taken to address serious weaknesses in governance and to align international assistance behind the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. We are at a critical juncture in our efforts in Afghanistan. A "political surge" is required to reverse negative trends and accelerate progress in those areas where we have achieved successes. UNAMA and my Special Representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, are ready to play their role in mobilizing efforts in support of the agenda established in Paris. This will be possible only if both the Government of Afghanistan and the international community are prepared to make difficult policy decisions and remain committed to implementing them.

III. Key political developments

A. National Assembly, political parties and elections

7. During the reporting period, the National Assembly implemented a fairly heavy legislative agenda, adopting laws on the civil service, public health and political parties. The national budget was also adopted prior to 21 March 2008, which is the start of the Government's fiscal year. Laws on the media and on the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution were adopted by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority, following presidential vetoes.

8. On the other hand, continuing disagreement within the National Assembly over the number of seats allocated to Kuchis (nomads) in the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) led to a stand-off when Kuchi parliamentarians refused to attend parliamentary sessions for several weeks. The Wolesi Jirga was thus denied a quorum and was unable to adopt the electoral law. Given a provision in existing legislation that no new electoral law can be passed within a year of a forthcoming election, the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections will be held under the existing electoral law, adopted in 2005.

9. On a more positive note, after extensive discussions, the Wolesi Jirga passed draft legislation on the Independent Election Commission, amending the previous law on electoral organization. Key changes include a provision that election commissioners will be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Wolesi Jirga. The draft law now must be passed by the Meshrano Jirga, the upper house of the National Assembly, and signed by the President if it is to become law.

10. The Cabinet approved the proposal of the Independent Election Commission to run voter registration in four phases between 6 October 2008 and 3 February 2009. The Afghan National Police will have the primary responsibility for security, supported by the Afghan National Army and the International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF). Both voter registration and the elections will be prepared and organized by the Commission with support from the international community. Following a request by the President of Afghanistan, Hâmid Karzai, the United Nations will coordinate international efforts as well as provide technical assistance through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project entitled "Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)". Donors have already provided generous contributions to UNDP for voter registration. An additional appeal for the election will be made to donors early in November 2008, once the budget has been finalized.

11. In anticipation of the forthcoming elections, political parties have intensified their activities. Major congresses were held in Kabul and Jalalabad by Afghan-i Millat, Hezb-i Islami, Junbesh-i Milli and several smaller parties. The National United Front, a coalition of 18 parties, has begun to develop a policy platform and identify a presidential candidate. More than 110 political parties have been registered.

B. Regional environment

12. The important role that the neighbours and regional partners of Afghanistan can play in promoting the country's development and stability has been increasingly and rightly emphasized. The opportunities afforded by trade and transit, energy market integration and road and rail infrastructure dominate bilateral and multilateral agendas, along with cooperation to combat terrorism and the illegal narcotics trade. To that end, President Karzai attended the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), held in Colombo, on 2 and 3 August, and the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, held in Dushanbe, on 27 and 28 August.

13. One of the most important results of regional cooperation efforts is the agreement by Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Turkmenistan to begin construction of a trans-Afghan gas pipeline in 2010. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded memorandums of understanding with Afghanistan on bilateral trade, and agreed to construct a teacher-training centre in Kabul. At a recent meeting of the Tripartite Commission, comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pakistan agreed to review the timetable for repatriation beyond 2009 and to ensure voluntary, dignified, safe and gradual returns. Finally, in May 2008, Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan agreed in Tehran on a "triangular" initiative to cooperate more closely in counter-narcotics efforts, including through the establishment of a joint planning cell, to be located in Tehran, which will facilitate information exchange and joint counter-narcotics interventions. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime was invited to function as the secretariat for the initiative.

14. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been dominated by discussions on the increase in cross-border insurgency activities, an issue that had in the past appeared to be fuelling a climate of suspicion and recrimination, with each Government blaming the other on different occasions for insufficient efforts against terrorism and for interfering in each other's domestic affairs. On 9 July, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan were present at a meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan. Both Ministers emphasized

the close connections between the two countries and the need for greater cooperation to leverage economic opportunities and combat insecurity. On 2 August, in the margins of the SAARC summit in Colombo, President Karzai and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, agreed to resume a number of bilateral activities, including planning for the next peace jirga. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi, and Chief of the Army Staff, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, also visited Afghanistan for discussions on bilateral cooperation and security challenges. On 9 September, President Karzai attended the swearing-in ceremony of the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, in Islamabad and expressed optimism about relations between the two countries.

15. During his visits to Islamabad and Tehran, my Special Representative discussed questions relating to bilateral and regional cooperation, in particular counter-narcotics and refugee issues. He emphasized the central role that both countries have to play in achieving stability in Afghanistan and the region and the potential for regional economic development. The Special Representative offered to provide assistance in accordance with his mandate. In Islamabad, he underlined the need to strengthen the political dialogue between the two countries and to follow up on the peace jirga which was held in Kabul in August 2007.

IV. Security

16. Since the issuance of my special report (S/2008/434), the security situation has deteriorated markedly. The number of security incidents rose to 983 in August, which is the highest since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and represents a 44 per cent increase compared with the same month in 2007. While armed clashes between Afghan and international security forces on the one hand, and insurgents on the other, have continued to increase in number and intensity, asymmetric attacks carried out by the insurgents have increased even more.

17. Three trends can be identified in the context of this deterioration: a greater focus by insurgent groups on hitherto stable areas; more sophisticated planning of operations by insurgents, in particular asymmetric attacks; and an increase in civilian casualties.

18. While the main focus of the insurgency remains the southern and eastern parts of the country, where it has historically been strong, insurgent influence has intensified in areas that were previously relatively calm, including in the provinces closest to Kabul. The determination of the insurgency has also been demonstrated by two particularly brazen attacks against ISAF. The first was a direct attack against an ISAF outpost of the United States of America in Nuristan in July, and the second an ambush on French ISAF forces in Kabul province in August. Attacks were also carried out in the capital itself, including during a military parade on 27 April in the presence of President Karzai, his Cabinet and the National Assembly, and a suicide attack against the Embassy of India in July in which 54 civilians were killed. The fact that the insurgents have the ability to carry out operations in the capital shows that they are becoming increasingly sophisticated. However, while the insurgents were able to carry out a few major attacks, the overall number of security incidents in the capital decreased, reflecting the enhanced capability of the Afghan intelligence and security forces.

19. The trend in insurgency tactics observed in 2007 — from armed clashes with security forces to attacks of an asymmetric nature — continued and became more pronounced in 2008, leading to a sharp increase in the number of civilian casualties. Of the more than 3,800 lives lost in insurgency-related violence by the end of July, over one third were civilians. To a large extent, that shift can be attributed to a limited number of lethal attacks in high-density civilian areas, such as the attack against the Embassy of India. The number of civilian casualties caused by operations carried out by international and Afghan security forces also increased.

20. Another worrying trend is a significant increase in the number of attacks against aid workers, convoys and facilities. More than 120 attacks have been targeted at humanitarian and development programmes in 2008, as a result of which 30 humanitarian aid workers have died and 92 have been abducted. Those attacks included the ambush, on 13 August, by suspected Hezb-i Islami/Haqqani militants of an International Rescue Committee vehicle in Logar province, 50 km south of Kabul, in which three female international aid workers and their Afghan driver were shot and killed. On 26 August, a Japanese aid worker was abducted and subsequently murdered in Nangarhar Province. At least 22 contracted World Food Programme convoys were attacked, destroyed or looted. Attacks against schools have also continued. Between January and August 2008, 113 such incidents were reported, including the burning of 47 schools and attacks against 12 others, resulting in the deaths of 12 people and injuries to 8.

21. On 14 September, a United Nations convoy of medical staff conducting polio vaccination activities was attacked by a vehicle-borne suicide device in the Spin Boldak district of Kandahar. Two doctors contracted by the World Health Organization and one UNAMA driver were killed. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

22. The deteriorating security situation has hampered the implementation by UNAMA of its mandate. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security has assessed approximately 90 of almost 400 districts as areas of extreme risk. According to figures from the Government of Afghanistan, 12 districts are completely beyond its control. Difficulty of access is compounded by the insurgency's aggressive tactics to cut off major provincial centres. Consequently, even areas that have a permissible security environment are increasingly inaccessible to the United Nations, the Government and non-military actors.

V. Security sector and rule of law

A. Afghan security forces

23. The Afghan National Army has continued to improve and has now reached a strength of more than 62,000. Following a request by the Minister of Defence of Afghanistan, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, at its ninth meeting, on 9 September, agreed to raise the recruitment ceiling from 88,000 to 122,000 by 2012, reflecting the readiness of the Government of Afghanistan to gradually take greater responsibility for the security of the country. Another important step in that direction was taken on 30 August, when national security forces led by the Afghan National Army assumed the lead responsibility for security in Kabul.

24. The reform and rebuilding of the Afghan National Police has, on the other hand, been slower and less successful. Some 70 per cent of the 82,000-strong force is estimated to be present for duty. Focused district development and in-district reform programmes, led by the United States of America, are being implemented to improve the quality of training and leadership in 42 districts, particularly in the insurgency-affected south.

25. Serious shortcomings remain, however, with regard to training and equipping the police. Since the Afghan National Police is the only security force that maintains a durable presence in communities across Afghanistan, its shortcomings have serious effects. A weak, ineffective or distrusted police force becomes an obstacle to implementing an effective counter-insurgency effort, combating crime and ensuring respect for rule of law, securing a stable Government presence in unstable provinces and keeping vital highways safe and accessible. Border police are almost non-existent along significant parts of the country's border and are unable to prevent large-scale smuggling and drug trafficking. Insufficient numbers of police officers and lack of training and equipment have contributed to a very high casualty rate among the members of the Afghan National Police. As many as 720 police officers have been killed since March. Finally, corruption remains a problem. There are credible reports of police positions, particularly in lucrative transit and drug-trafficking corridors, being "sold" for large amounts of money.

26. Given the critical importance of the police force, a comprehensive initiative is required to strengthen and expand its ability to carry out critical tasks. On 31 August, the International Police Coordination Board adopted a vision for the Afghan National Police, in accordance with the decisions taken at the seventh Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meeting. Implementing that vision will require coherence among current reform efforts. It will also require additional resources, in particular, trainers and mentors provided by the international community who are able to deploy at the district level, as well as sufficient equipment for the police force.

B. International forces and civil-military coordination

27. ISAF, which now numbers 55,000 troops, has increased its presence in eastern and southern Afghanistan, as well as in Kapisa, Logar and Wardak provinces, around Kabul. The ISAF Commander, General David McKiernan, has assumed responsibility for non-ISAF forces of the United States of America in Afghanistan, improving unity of command. ISAF has initiated a review of the provincial reconstruction team concept, with the goal of preparing a transition to civilian and Afghan leadership as soon as possible. Coordination of provincial reconstruction team policies will henceforth be led by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, created by President Karzai in 2007 to generate stronger governance in unstable provinces and districts.

C. Rule of law

28. During the period under review, there have been incremental improvements in the field of justice, which remains one of the most essential yet challenging sectors of activity. Following the establishment of the National Justice Sector Strategy and

the National Justice Programme in March 2008, the three justice institutions (the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Office of the Attorney General) have established a programme oversight committee with World Bank assistance.

29. In addition, the Office of the Attorney General and the Ministry of the Interior established a joint commission to draft guidelines for cooperation between police and prosecutors in the detection and investigation of crimes. At the end of July, the first General Assembly of the Independent Afghan Bar Association met in Kabul to decide on its constitution and elect officials. The number of registered lawyers in Afghanistan tripled from 200 in 2007 to almost 600 in 2008, 130 of them being women. With support from UNDP, UNAMA has now deployed rule-of-law officers in each of its regional offices to lead the effort to coordinate international support for the justice sector.

30. In the area of legal reform, the Government enacted laws on terrorism, abduction and human trafficking and on the creation of the High Office of Oversight to combat corruption. Regarding procedural due process, the legislative department of the Ministry of Justice has completed the draft of a new comprehensive criminal procedure code that is being reviewed by a joint group of experts from Afghanistan and the international community.

31. Further progress is hampered by the fact that the Supreme Court, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Ministry of Justice suffer from a chronic lack of resources, inadequate infrastructure and a shortage of qualified, experienced, educated and trained judges and prosecutors. While training has improved, the implementation of pay and grade reforms has been slow, and it remains difficult to recruit and retain competent officers. Corruption and intimidation by officials remain common. Effective disciplinary and ethical oversight mechanisms providing due process are lacking, as is systematic case auditing and tracking.

32. Detention centres and prisons in Afghanistan remain in a serious state of neglect. Juvenile facilities are too few in number and range from rented houses to facilities where juveniles are mixed with adult convicts. In July and August there were three separate incidents of hostage-taking in the Pol-i-Charkhi prison in Kabul. As a result of inadequate capacity in the prison system, the Afghan National Army has had to assume some responsibility for prison security. There is a critical need for increased investment in the Central Prison Department to address continuing problems in the corrections system, ranging from poor food and sanitation to crisis-management training.

D. Mine action

33. In the first half of 2008, the United Nations-managed Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan, with Government support, destroyed 38,297 anti-personnel landmines, 419 anti-tank mines and 957,362 explosive remnants of war and provided mine-awareness education for 760,434 people — men, women and children. More than 80 per cent of the mine-action requirements set out in the Afghanistan Compact have been reached. However, the programme faces significant funding shortfalls for 2009. If those shortfalls are not addressed, they will result in a substantial reduction of operational outputs. As a result, Afghanistan will risk being unable to meet its obligations under the terms of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Afghanistan Compact and the Millennium Development Goals.

E. Counter-narcotics

34. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released the *Afghanistan opium survey 2008* on 27 August. As noted in paragraph 5 above, the Office reported that there had been a 19 per cent decrease in opium cultivation and a 6 per cent decline in production. The increase in the number of poppy-free provinces in the past year means that more than half of the country's 34 provinces are now poppy-free. Thus, poppy production is no longer an Afghanistan-wide phenomenon but, rather, concentrated in areas where insurgent and organized crime groups are particularly active. At present, 98 per cent of the country's opium is grown in seven southern and south-western provinces: Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and (to a lesser extent) Day Kundi and Zabul. Against those achievements, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that crop yields actually increased in 2008 and that only 5,480 of the 50,000 hectare eradication target was reached. Achieving that result also proved costly in terms of human life: 77 members of the eradication force were killed, a six-fold increase in casualties compared with the previous year.

35. The decrease in cultivation is attributed to a combination of improved governance and poor climatic conditions, including cold and drought. Active public awareness campaigns also played an important role. If progress to increase the number of poppy-free provinces is to be consolidated, public awareness campaigns will need to be coupled with agricultural and alternative development programmes and narcotics interdiction and anti-corruption activities.

36. Implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy, a priority set at the seventh meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, held in February 2008, remains slow. A provincial approach has been agreed upon and provincial counter-narcotics plans are being prepared. Unfortunately, agreement has yet to be reached on a funding mechanism for those provincial plans. To date, the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund has approved more than 60 projects to support the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy as well as the Good Performance Initiative, a separate financing window under the Trust Fund, for a total amount of $61 million. Following a review in 2007 and extensive consultations, the Government prepared a proposal on the reform and restructuring of the Trust Fund that was endorsed by the Cabinet subcommittee on counter narcotics. The Trust Fund was reactivated in June and has approved more than $20 million in support of development projects in 14 provinces. However, agreement on the longer-term restructuring of the Trust Fund remains deadlocked. The fight against illegal narcotics is further frustrated by the fact that senior Government officials who are sincere about addressing the problem are increasingly being intimidated, while corrupt officials and drug traffickers continue to operate with impunity. In a particularly disturbing incident, on 4 September, the head of the appeals court of the Central Narcotics Tribunal was shot and killed on his way to work in Kabul.

37. International players in Afghanistan, both civil and military, have recently expressed renewed interest in countering the flow of chemical precursors to illicit

heroin manufacturing within the country. On 11 June 2008, the Security Council adopted resolution 1817 (2008), calling on Member States to increase cooperation in monitoring the international trade in chemical precursors in order to prevent their diversion to illicit markets. Coordination efforts between the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and key regional and international players who oppose precursor trafficking groups have improved substantially. The national authorities in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, among other neighbouring countries, made very significant seizures of acetic anhydride, the first such seizures since 2001. Activities within Afghanistan have led to an increase in available strategic intelligence, and a regional effort, facilitated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to map opiates and precursor chemicals through forensic investigations has been initiated.

38. The International Narcotics Control Board plays a leading role in the international control of precursors. The Board has provided training to Afghan authorities and recommended specific measures to the Government for precursor control. This year, the Board launched an initiative entitled "Project Cohesion" to exchange intelligence on the diversion of heroin precursors and monitor the movement of chemicals and enforcement operations. As a result of intensified international interdiction activities and improved information exchange on shipments and seizures of heroin chemicals, the number of identified diversions to Afghanistan has increased. Moreover, after a period of several years during which a very limited number of seizures of acetic anhydride were carried out, more than 20 cases involving seizure or suspicious shipment in international trade were recently identified. Several hundred tons of acetic anhydride have thus been prevented from reaching Afghanistan.

39. It is essential for Governments to intensify their participation in activities led by the International Narcotics Control Board and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to prevent the diversion and trafficking of precursors from exporting countries to Afghanistan and neighbouring countries. Support for the Afghan Government in developing the interdiction and investigation capacities of anti-narcotics enforcement agencies and forensic laboratories must also continue.

VI. Governance

40. The need to improve governance was a major focus of the Paris Conference. Some progress in that area has been made. The adoption of an anti-corruption law, the establishment of the High Office of Oversight to combat corruption and the plan to start implementing pay and grading reforms in five ministries in September 2008 are all indications that the Government of Afghanistan is serious about meeting its Paris commitments.

41. Further such signs include the release, by the inter-institutional commission led by Chief Justice Azimi, of an anti-corruption strategy report at the end of June 2008. Those initial steps must be followed by the establishment of effective anti-corruption tools, as well as a visible and consistent political commitment to fight corruption.

42. Following the Cabinet's endorsement of the five-year strategic plan of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, the Government has begun to clarify

the functions of local government and to improve the effectiveness of subnational government.

43. With a view to strengthening the capacity of Afghan officials, the Civil Service Training Institute began training recent university graduates and providing refresher courses to existing civil servants. The UNDP-supported Civil Service Leadership Development project is supporting the Institute in delivering leadership training programmes to civil servants across the various line ministries and assisting it in adapting the project training programmes to its needs, thereby guaranteeing the sustainability of the leadership training programmes.

44. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance has signed agreements with India and the Islamic Republic of Iran to expand public service training, which is required if the needs of Afghanistan are to be met. The Government also established a National Institute of Management and Administration, which draws students from all provinces to educate future managers and administrators.

45. Despite those positive developments, the key challenge for the central Government will be to create capacity at the subnational level, where the lack of resources, as well as corruption, continues to have a crippling effect.

VII. Human rights

46. Afghanistan continues to face serious deficiencies in the area of human rights as a result of, inter alia, the impact of an escalating conflict on civilians, a pervasive atmosphere of impunity, absence of official impetus for the transitional justice process, a weak judicial system and threats to the media from both State and non-State actors. Many of those deficiencies also contribute to very high levels of poverty in Afghanistan, affecting 42 per cent of the population.

47. The atmosphere of impunity perpetuates the notion that crime and the abuse of power is acceptable. That undermines efforts to uphold the rule of law, including redress for victims of human rights violations as well as access to judicial processes that are just and credible.

48. In spite of repeated calls by Afghans, including victims' groups, for the implementation of the Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice there is very limited political support for it. Civil society organizations are increasingly concerned about this issue, and welcomed the initiatives by UNAMA and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission to raise awareness of reconciliation issues.

49. In this regard, measures have been taken to strengthen national forensic expertise in the investigation and preservation of mass grave sites. The United Nations has provided technical expertise to, for example, the ad hoc forensic exercise to identify the remains of the former President, Daud Khan, who was killed in 1978 with his family and some of his staff. This is an emblematic case in the endeavour to establish and document evidence critical to ascertaining the truth about the past.

50. Extrajudicial measures continue to be used to suppress criticism and dissenting religious and political views. Reports of intimidation against journalists have increased, casting doubts on the Government's commitment to freedom of

expression. The high-profile case against a student of journalism sentenced to death on charges of blasphemy in January 2008 after he circulated literature on women and Islam obtained from the Internet has exposed severe systemic failings in the functioning of the criminal justice system. The alleged crime is not a criminal offence under Afghan law, yet the student remains in detention. The case has now reached the appeals court.

A. Gender

51. The National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan was adopted by the Cabinet on 19 May 2008. The Paris Declaration reaffirmed the commitments of both the Government and the international community to support its implementation. UNAMA, UNDP and the United Nations Development Fund for Women are providing support to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Women's Affairs for the effective coordination of Action Plan implementation at all levels of governance. The UNDP Gender Equality Project is currently active in seven ministries with the aim of developing their capacities in the area of gender integration.

52. Sexual and gender-based violence against women and children is common. In the system of administration of justice, the criminalization of women who have been victims of gender-based violence and gender discrimination in the application of customary law continues to be a major concern. In a case raised publicly by my Special Representative, two convicted perpetrators of a gang rape in Sar-i-Pul in September 2005 were released in May 2008, allegedly as a result of corruption in the justice system. Nonetheless, the high incidence of sexual assault was denounced by the President and the Ministry of the Interior in August 2008, and initiatives by relevant United Nations agencies and programmes with the corresponding ministries and civil society groups have increased the visibility of serious violations of women's rights.

B. Protection of civilians

53. In the first eight months of 2008, UNAMA recorded a total of 1,445 civilian deaths, an increase of 39 per cent over the 1,040 civilian deaths recorded in the same period in 2007. Of those, 55 per cent were attributed to attacks by anti-Government elements, 40 per cent to pro-Government forces and 5 per cent to unknown agents.

54. The majority of civilian casualties attributed to anti-Government elements are the result of suicide and improvised explosive device attacks, with a reported 551 civilians having been killed in such incidents in the first eight months of 2008. The increase in fatalities as a result of operations by anti-Government elements can be attributed, in part, to the greater resort to asymmetric attacks, which are often carried out in crowded civilian areas. Insurgents continue to wage a systematic campaign of intimidation and violence against Afghan civilians who are perceived to be supporting the Government, the international community and military forces. UNAMA has recorded 142 summary executions carried out by the armed opposition in 2008 and dozens of cases of threats, intimidation and harassment. The victims include doctors, teachers, students, tribal elders, civilian Government employees,

former police and military personnel and labourers involved in public-interest construction work.

55. Air strikes remain responsible for the largest percentage of civilian deaths attributed to pro-Government forces. UNAMA recorded 393 civilian deaths as a result of air strikes in the first eight months of 2008. The most notable example took place in Shindand district on 22 August, where, according to United Nations and other reports, an air strike killed more than 90 civilians, including 60 children. That incident reinvigorated a public debate over civilian casualties and the use of air strikes in populated areas. Further to the visit by my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, a monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict has been set up in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005).

VIII. Humanitarian situation

56. The humanitarian situation is worsening. The most pressing problems today are the perilous food security situation, which is affecting as much as one sixth of the population and is caused by the current drought and exacerbated by high global food prices, and the impact of the conflict on humanitarian access. As a consequence of the drought, an estimated 1.2 million children under 5 and 550,000 pregnant and lactating women in 22 provinces are at high risk of severe malnutrition.

57. The Afghanistan joint appeal to address the humanitarian consequences of the rise in food prices, launched in January, received nearly all of the $81.3 million requested with a view to providing a safety net for the 425 000 most vulnerable households. In response to the impending crisis, Vice-President Khalili and the United Nations launched, on 9 July, a second joint emergency appeal to address the high food price and drought crisis. The request was for an additional $404 million to support nearly 2 million people affected by the current conditions, in addition to the 2.6 million people assisted during the previous six months. Resource mobilization for the second appeal has been slow to date; only 32 per cent of the total amount requested has been met. The response is also insufficient to ensure that vulnerable communities have access to water. Lack of such access may lead to the displacement of populations owing to extreme water shortages in certain areas.

58. Access to communities for humanitarian activities continues to be restricted by increasing insecurity; 40 to 50 per cent of the country is inaccessible to United Nations aid activities, which affects service delivery. Attacks on aid convoys occurred mainly along the ring road between Kandahar in the south and Herat in the west and in the central provinces of Ghazni, Wardak and Logar. Efforts to eradicate polio in insurgency-affected areas face a great challenge.

59. Since the beginning of the year, more than 200,000 Afghan refugees have been repatriated, largely from Pakistan. The refugee camp/settlement of Jalozai in the north-western frontier province of Pakistan, which once housed some 100,000 refugees, was closed in May 2008. The vast majority returned to eastern Afghanistan. Many returnee families were further displaced once they were back in Afghanistan, since they were unable to return to their homes owing to the prevailing insecurity, difficult socio-economic conditions or disputes relating to land ownership. Those returnees remain in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The

Government of Afghanistan and UNHCR have set 19 November 2008 as the date for an international conference on return and reintegration to review the timetable for the return of refugees beyond 2009. It is intended to mobilize support for existing return and reintegration/development activities, as outlined in the sector strategy on refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

60. The overall situation with regard to internally displaced persons within Afghanistan has deteriorated. Armed conflict in the southern region, ethnic strife in the areas of Behsud and the potential impact of the drought in areas in the northern (Faryab, Jowsjan and Sar-i-Pul) and western (Badghis and Ghor) parts of the country have resulted in new displacements of thousands of Afghans.

IX. Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

61. As detailed in my special report (S/2008/434), more than 80 delegations participated in the Paris Conference, which I co-chaired with the Presidents of Afghanistan and France. The Conference saw the launch of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and resulted in pledges totalling $21.4 billion.

62. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board met on 6 July and 9 September 2008 to discuss the implementation of the Strategy and the commitments undertaken in the Paris Declaration. Particular focus was placed on governance, aid effectiveness and the fight against corruption. Following the Paris Conference, the Board accepted a proposal by my Special Representative to streamline its decision-making process by replacing the numerous consultative groups with three standing committees that mirror the three pillars of the Strategy: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development. The aim of that reform effort is to make the Board more focused on implementation, more flexible in the face of a changing environment and more oriented to problem-solving. My Special Representative has also proposed that the capacity of UNAMA to support the Board, provide strategic advice and ensure better donor coordination be increased in the 2009 Mission budget.

63. Following the Paris Conference, UNAMA undertook to enhance the coordination of donor efforts and to strengthen aid effectiveness. Tangible steps include support for the Government in preparing the Afghanistan country chapter of the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration and in developing an aid effectiveness strategy. Collection of data for the Survey is currently under way, targeting bilateral donors, United Nations agencies and programmes and private companies to provide clear indicators for enhancing collaboration and coordination under the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. The Government of Afghanistan has also undertaken a study on the local economic impact of international development assistance in Afghanistan and on progress towards achieving commitments outlined in the Afghanistan Compact with regard to the use of local resources in development.

X. Mission operations and support

64. The Mission is currently preparing to open new provincial offices, further strengthening the good offices and outreach capability offered by its existing 17 field offices.

65. As I noted in my special report, UNAMA will need to strengthen its capacity in a number of key areas in order to be able to meet priorities identified in its mandate and at the Paris Conference. Significant staffing increases, some structural changes and an increase in essential security-related equipment will all be detailed in the upcoming UNAMA budget proposal to the General Assembly.

66. While vacancy rates and staff retention continue to present challenges within the prevailing Mission security environment, a concerted effort to reduce vacancy rates has made progress. The introduction of a special allowance represents a significant contribution to supporting recruitment and retention of staff, and consideration should be given to extending it to include United Nations Volunteers working with UNAMA.

XI. Observations

67. **The present report presents a mixed picture of the situation in Afghanistan. Regardless of the progress made in certain areas, my overall impression is that the situation in the country has deteriorated over the past six months. Nevertheless, I strongly believe that the negative trend can be reversed. The Paris Conference in June provided an agenda and a road map. Our joint challenge now is to implement the commitments undertaken at the Conference.**

68. **Ultimately, success will depend on our ability to bring about a "political surge" that musters the political determination to address those areas in which international and Afghan efforts have been insufficient, and to accelerate progress where gains have been made. Afghan people throughout the country must be able to see and experience more concrete results of and benefits from the assistance that they hear has been pledged to their country. They must see that corruption is being punished and competence rewarded. Civilians must be protected, not only from terrorism and insurgency, but also from unintended consequences of pro-Government military operations. They must be given a stronger sense of confidence in the international community, both civilian and military, and especially in their own Government.**

69. **I am convinced that, in order to achieve that end, a change of pace and direction is required. It is obvious that many of the commitments undertaken in Paris cannot be implemented in the short term. Nonetheless, every party to the Paris Conference must do its utmost to implement the commitments made there as expeditiously as possible. It is essential that the people of Afghanistan begin to see quickly and clearly that we have embarked on a new course and that it will produce results.**

70. **The Paris agenda is clear. It represents a major commitment to implementing and fully supporting the Afghanistan National Development Strategy with a view to addressing critical priorities, such as building strong and trustworthy institutions and increasing agricultural production and energy output. It is, above all, a joint commitment by the international community and**

the Government of Afghanistan to improving aid effectiveness and combating corruption.

71. **The United Nations and my Special Representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, have called repeatedly for immediate steps to be taken to start the process of implementing those commitments. The sense of urgency has been underlined repeatedly. Three months after the Paris Conference, we must all demonstrate that we are willing to honour those commitments.**

72. **My Special Representative has been given the task of coordinating the international community in its relationship with the Government of Afghanistan. The success of his mandate ultimately depends on the readiness of all stakeholders to be coordinated and to ensure that their policies are in accordance with the Paris commitments. If that readiness is not clearly expressed, UNAMA and my Special Representative will not be able to succeed.**

73. **On that basis, I consider it essential to emphasize that, while the Paris Conference was an important event, it must be seen as more than just an event. It must be used as an instrument to reverse negative trends, to inspire the Afghan public and to further inspire the confidence of the global community of friends of Afghanistan. In Paris, a number of speakers underlined the sense of urgency. That sense of urgency must now be translated from words into deeds.**

74. **I would like to thank my Special Representative for his tireless work since taking up his position in March, and express my gratitude to all of the Mission's personnel for their commitment and perseverance. I appreciate their fortitude in operating under difficult circumstances and in such a challenging environment. I should also like to thank all of the Mission's partners, including the United Nations country team, as well as humanitarian agencies, Member States and other international organizations for the support that they continue to lend to UNAMA in its work.**

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Agenda item 103 (c)
Elections to fill vacancies in principal organs: election of five members of the International Court of Justice

Security Council
Sixty-third year

Letter dated 23 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With regard to the forthcoming election of five members of the International Court of Justice to take place during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, I have the honour to transmit to you the following information:

The note by the Secretary-General, which contains the list of candidates nominated by national groups to fill vacancies in the International Court of Justice (A/63/187-S/2008/503), does not include the nomination by the Spanish national group in the Permanent Court of Arbitration of Mr. Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade (Brazil). The Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations would like to inform all States Members of the United Nations that it duly transmitted to the Secretariat the nomination by the Spanish national group in a timely manner.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council under agenda item 103 (c).

(*Signed*) Juan Antonio **Yáñez-Barnuevo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations

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Agenda item 10
Report of the Peacebuilding Commission

Security Council
Sixty-third year

Letter dated 19 September 2008 from the Secretary-General to the Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission

In its presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council invited me to provide advice within 12 months to the relevant United Nations organs on how best to take forward within the United Nations system the issues pertaining to securing sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing. In particular, the Council emphasized the need to take into consideration the views of the Peacebuilding Commission on how to coordinate peacebuilding activities and encourage the mobilization and most effective use of resources for urgent peacebuilding needs.

You will agree with me that the aforementioned task is critical to our collective efforts to enable coherent and integrated response of the United Nations in complex post-conflict situations. Therefore, I intend to dedicate the requisite efforts and capacities to undertake that ambitious exercise within the United Nations system with the valuable contribution of the Peacebuilding Commission. To that end, and as you are aware, I recently appointed Ms. Jane Holl Lute as Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and asked her to coordinate the exercise on my behalf. I also asked Ms. Lute to indicate the appropriate timing for the contribution of the Commission to this exercise and to represent me, in accordance with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), in all the Commission's deliberations in this regard.

I am confident that the Peacebuilding Commission will play a constructive role in informing the outcome of this exercise. I also trust that by addressing critical gaps in the response of the United Nations to post-conflict situations across the system, the Commission's advisory role will assume greater significance for all relevant United Nations and non-United Nations operational entities in the countries concerned. This is, in my view, an important step towards a more coherent and integrated approach to peacebuilding.

08-51917 (E) 021008

I would highly appreciate it if you would have the present letter circulated to all members of the Peacebuilding Commission and issued as a document of the Commission.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

United Nations A/63/375

General Assembly

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 29
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

Rapporteur: Mr. Jonas **Jølle** (Norway)

Summary

The present report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) describes the activities of the Group during 2008 and provides a detailed outline of the current financial situation of UNRWA. The Working Group unanimously adopted the report at its meeting on 1 October 2008. As in previous reports of the Group, the present report closes with a number of concluding remarks addressed to all Member States.

08-51955 (E) 171008

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I. Introduction: origin and background of the Working Group

1. The Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established by the General Assembly under resolution 2656 (XXV) to study all aspects of the financing of the Agency. In that resolution, the Assembly requested the Working Group to assist the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of UNRWA in reaching solutions to the problems posed by the Agency's financial crisis.

2. At the twenty-fifth session and all those that followed, the General Assembly considered the reports submitted to it by the Working Group (most recently, A/62/361)[1] and adopted resolutions commending the efforts of the Working Group and requesting it to continue them for a further year (most recently, resolution 62/104).

3. The Working Group consists of the representatives of France, Ghana, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The Chairman of the Working Group is Baki İlkin of Turkey.

II. Activities of the Working Group during 2008

4. During the year, the Working Group held two meetings, the first on 12 September, in which the Director of the UNRWA Representative Office, Andrew Whitley, briefed the Group on the Agency's financial situation and developments facing the Agency. A second meeting was held on 19 September. On 1 October, the present report was agreed and adopted.

III. Financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

5. Against its $994.2 million budget for the biennium 2006-2007, in 2007 the Agency received $434.7 million in income for its cash and in-kind planned expenditure, leaving a large funding gap of $71.0 million for the year. UNRWA's cash and in-kind regular budget for the current biennium 2008-2009 amounts to $1,093.2 million, of which the cash component was $541.8 million for 2008 and $545.6 million for 2009. In mid-2008, UNRWA revised the cash component of its regular budget for that year to $546.4 million to cover unbudgeted additional costs, including salary increases, resulting, inter alia, from the global food and energy crises. The anticipated funding gap for 2008 as at 31 August was $78.7 million. UNRWA's regular budget income for 2008 was expected to be $467.7 million ($440.5 million in financial contributions, $19.2 million in transfers from the United Nations assessed contributions budget, to cover the costs related to 119 international posts, and $8 million in forecast interest income and exchange rate gains).

6. The Working Group noted the $111.0 million deficit against UNRWA's $135.9 million project budget for 2007. The deficit against the 2008 project budget

[1] For the report of the Fourth Committee on its consideration of the most recent report of the Working Group, see A/62/404.

of $56.8 million was expected to reach $38.1 million. The capital requirements of UNRWA's programmes, as well as the costs related to environmental health improvements and shelter rehabilitation, are contained chiefly in the project budget. These requirements include construction and expansion of schools, health centres, water and sanitation facilities, and camp improvement activities. The Working Group was particularly concerned that, in the light of the constraints on the Agency's ability to deliver quality services imposed by inadequate physical facilities, large, recurrent project budget deficits could adversely affect UNRWA's regular services for the refugees.

7. The Working Group was informed by UNRWA at its 12 September meeting that the $1,093 million budget for the biennium 2008-2009 budget — a figure that excluded projects — had been endorsed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions at the sixty-second session in October 2007. The budget described the strengthening of results-based management and programme delivery that UNRWA is implementing in line with the Agency's three-year organizational development reform programme, now at its mid-stage. The Report of the Advisory Committee was subsequently adopted by the Fifth Committee.

8. While benefiting from increased contributions from a number of major donors, and from favourable exchange rate trends, overall pledges made to UNRWA's regular budget in 2008 were anticipated to fall significantly short of adjusted budgeted expenditure. In part, that was due to unanticipated increases in the cost of fuel and food commodities, as well as staff salary increases granted because of rapidly rising local costs of living. The Agency appealed to donors to fully fund the biennium budget as a whole, on the grounds that UNRWA represents the principal source of general education, primary health, social, relief, and microfinance services for the refugee population. UNRWA's cost-effective services constituted a vital investment in the human development and well-being of the refugees by the international community. Declining educational performance among refugees in some UNRWA schools in 2007, notably in the Gaza Strip, provided alarming evidence of the results of, inter alia, chronic underfunding of the Agency's core services. The continued commitment of the international community to the refugees remained essential, in the absence of a just and durable solution to their problem and in the light of the continuing conflicts in the region, which have had devastating economic and social consequences for them.

9. As of 30 June 2008, the Agency was owed approximately $24.3 million in VAT reimbursements from the Palestinian Authority, almost double the $12.8 million figure recorded at the end of 2006. While regrettable in the light of UNRWA's financial constraints, the inability of the Palestinian Authority to make good on its past commitments to eliminate this long-standing debt was understandable, considering the Authority's own straitened financial circumstances.

10. UNRWA was also concerned about port and related transit charges, exacerbated by security procedures imposed on humanitarian goods it imported through Israel. The Israeli authorities continued to impose transit charges on shipments entering the Gaza Strip, forcing UNRWA to pay $132,524 in 2007 and $91,853 between 1 January and 30 June 2008. In the Agency's view, the charge is a direct tax from which it ought to be exempted under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. UNRWA is normally required to

route its humanitarian shipments into the Gaza Strip through the main Karni crossing, except for construction materials, which enter through the secondary Sofa crossing. However, from 12 June 2007, the Karni crossing was closed for all containers. Thereafter all UNRWA shipments were required to enter through Sofa and, from November 2007, Kerem Shalom, neither of which are able to handle containers. Largely due to closure of Karni and the requirement from June 2007 to palletize container shipments for entry through the Sofa and Kerem Shalom crossings, the Agency's excess operating charges in 2007 for storage, demurrage, transportation and palletization were some $1.9 million. In the first six months of 2008 total excess charges for storage, demurrage, transportation and palletization amounted to some $0.98 million. Separately, from 14 June 2007, importation into the Gaza Strip of construction and other materials was prohibited. As a consequence, UNRWA was compelled to suspend or halt the tendering or completion of several construction and infrastructure projects. By the end of 2007, 22 construction and 17 infrastructure projects worth $84 million were still suspended. The Agency considers that, for substantial periods, the throughput of goods was not consistent with Israel's obligations under the Comay-Michelmore Agreement of 1967 and Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the report at the sixty-second session.[2] In this regard, the Working Group called on all parties concerned to facilitate the mission of UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestine refugee population.

11. Given the importance of ensuring that scarce donor resources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible, the Working Group acknowledged with appreciation the leadership of Commissioner-General Karen Koning AbuZayd and Deputy Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi, who oversaw the Agency's ongoing organizational development programme. The Working Group acknowledged with satisfaction the considerable progress made since 2006 in implementing the plan, which seeks to strengthen UNRWA's management and human resource capacity, enhance its effectiveness through improved planning, needs-assessments and programme evaluations, and further implementation of a results-based management and programme culture. As of 31 August 2008, pledges to the organizational development programme had reached $21.6 million, of which UNRWA had received $21.5 million, out of an anticipated total requirement of $26.2 million. To ensure that reforms in progress are sustained, the Working Group noted that UNRWA is seeking a further $17 million from bilateral donors to implement an enterprise resource planning system. This system can significantly improve the quality of information on which decisions are made in the Agency, increase the speed of internal processes, empower managers who are closer to the delivery of services and strengthen the connection between responsibility, delegation and accountability. Thus, it would provide UNRWA with a tool with which to cement a large number of management reforms currently under way. Noting the importance of the organizational development programme for the Agency's managerial transformation, the Working Group urged UNRWA to expedite its efforts to identify clear impact indicators and requested Member States to provide the balance of the financial support required as speedily as possible. It also urged UNRWA to continue to cooperate closely with the Secretariat and those other United Nations agencies which have been through similar reform efforts in order to benefit from their experiences and obtain possible synergies, with a cost-saving potential.

[2] A/62/361.

12. The Working Group noted with satisfaction that in the course of 2008 UNRWA made significant progress towards achieving its organizational development and other reform objectives. In areas such as programme cycle management, reforms in social safety net provision, human resource management and organizational processes, a solid foundation was laid for more efficient and effective delivery of services to Palestine refugees. Noting that these far-reaching reforms would have budgetary implications, the Working Group expressed the hope that the Agency would accelerate its efforts in this regard. The Working Group recalled that in December 2007 the General Assembly approved the establishment of six new international posts for UNRWA and asked the Secretariat to provide it with justifications for a further six posts in the biennium 2010-2011. The Working Group noted the Agency's long-standing concerns about the effects of understaffing on its ability to meet the demands of all stakeholders-donors, host authorities and the refugees themselves. Furthermore, compared with other comparable United Nations organizations, UNRWA senior management structures are undergraded, creating difficulties for the Agency in recruiting and retaining sufficiently experienced senior international staff. In this regard, the Working Group highlighted the importance of the overall institutional strengthening of the Agency in the coming period.

13. The Working Group was informed at its 12 September meeting that UNRWA's 2008 Emergency Appeal for $262.4 million, to cover needs in the occupied Palestinian territory, had received pledged contributions of $160.5 million as at 31 August, equivalent to 61 per cent of the total amount requested. The Appeal, which provides, inter alia, for badly needed food aid, emergency job creation and cash assistance, seeks to alleviate the dire humanitarian conditions in the territory. Following the seizure of power in the Gaza Strip by Hamas in June 2007, a tight economic blockade was imposed on the territory. These actions have created massive levels of unemployment and dependency on external assistance, primarily delivered through the United Nations. Noting with deep concern that 70 per cent of registered refugees in the Gaza Strip are currently dependent on UNRWA food aid for their essential sustenance, and that the degree of their vulnerability and dependence remains acute, the Working Group called for the Emergency Appeal to be fully funded by donors. Noting that a third of the total pledged to date derived from one donor state, the Working Group called on those traditional donors as well as States in the region that have not yet announced pledges to do so at an early date.

14. In May 2007, conflict erupted in and around the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon between the Lebanese Army and a militant Islamist group identifying itself as Fatah al-Islam. As of 2 September, when the fighting ceased, 498 persons had been killed, including some 169 Lebanese soldiers and 1 UNRWA staff member. The entire camp, which previously housed some 31,000 Palestine refugees and a small number of other persons, was completely destroyed, including housing, essential infrastructure and UNRWA facilities. The task of rebuilding Nahr el-Bared and caring for those displaced in the interim will be one of the largest challenges ever undertaken by UNRWA. A year after the conclusion of the fighting, one third of those displaced have been able to return to their original homes in the area adjacent to the camp, or else have been rehoused nearby. The remainder live in rented accommodation or else remain with host families in the nearby Beddawi camp. Donors have responded generously to the two appeals launched so far by UNRWA to support the displaced population. A request for $54.8 million for 12 months to the end of August 2008 was fully funded. Encouraged by this

precedent, the Working Group called on all donors to likewise support fully a further appeal for $42.7 million, covering 16 months from September 2008 to the end of 2009. Working closely with the Government of Lebanon, the World Bank, and other United Nations agencies, a donor conference was held in Vienna on 23 June 2008, at which a joint appeal was launched for $445 million over a three-year period to 2011, to support reconstruction of the camp and repairs in the surrounding area, including neighbouring Lebanese villages. The UNRWA component comprised $282.1 million. As at 31 August, firm pledges received had totalled $42.6 million, equivalent to 15 per cent of the amount required. While this sum is sufficient to enable preliminary work to commence on the site, the Working Group expressed serious concern that inadequate donor funding might result in a lack of momentum for such a major undertaking, bearing in mind its far-reaching political, security and humanitarian dimensions in Lebanon. The Group thus called upon all donors, particularly countries in the region, to lend their full support to the project. In addition, the Working Group encouraged UNRWA to press ahead with its comprehensive camp improvement initiative, which seeks to upgrade poor living conditions in the 12 Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, a project fully supported by the Government.

IV. Concluding remarks

15. The Working Group notes with concern the large funding gap anticipated for UNRWA's regular budget in 2008 and reiterates that it is the responsibility of the international community to ensure that UNRWA services are maintained at an acceptable level in quantitative and qualitative terms and to ensure that funding keeps pace with the changing needs of the refugee population.

16. The Working Group commends the Commissioner-General and all UNRWA staff for their tireless efforts over the past year to maintain the services of the Agency under very difficult operational circumstances. Among the challenges faced were the dire humanitarian consequences of the continuing conflict in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the consequences of the destruction of Nahr el-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon. It encourages the Commissioner-General to continue her fund-raising efforts and her commitment to keeping major donors and host authorities informed and involved, opening new avenues of support and funding and seeking a broader base of support among non-traditional donors. The Working Group is gratified by the support that a growing number of non-traditional donors have been giving to important Agency infrastructure projects and to Emergency Appeals, and encourages UNRWA to continue its efforts to widen the donor support base. It acknowledged with appreciation the significant project aid provided to the Agency over the past year by donors, including certain important Arab donors.

17. The Working Group calls for the early and complete fulfilment of outstanding pledges and other commitments to UNRWA. It also takes note of the importance for the Agency's planning purposes of early payment of pledges, coupled, where possible, with multi-year commitments of funds. The Working Group notes with regret that the budget for the biennium 2006-2007 was seriously underfunded. In 2007, contributions reached only $434.7 million, 86 per cent of a budget totalling $505.7 million. This year, the Agency projects its cash income at $467.7 million, 14 per cent below the required amount.

18. The Working Group continues to believe that UNRWA plays a vital role in preserving the stability and security of the region. To assist in meeting this strategic goal, adequate funding of the Agency's programmes, in accordance with the changing needs of the refugee community and in line with the comparable level of services provided by host authorities to their own citizens is essential. In this regard, the Working Group welcomes UNRWA's strengthened focus on strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and its commitment to results-based management, ensuring the most effective use of donor funds and a stronger emphasis on well-defined outcomes.

19. In view of the deep humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, the Group recognizes the essential humanitarian role played by UNRWA's emergency operations in alleviating the hardship of the refugees and preventing an even greater decline in their living conditions. It thus urges the international community to fully fund the Agency's Emergency Appeal for 2008, to which pledges have so far reached only 61 per cent.

20. The Working Group expressed concern about the growing number of restrictions on the movement of UNRWA staff and humanitarian goods into and out of the occupied Palestinian territory, and in particular within the West Bank. The Group called on the Israeli Government to accord free and unfettered access to the Agency. It recalled that in the Gaza Strip the prolonged closure of the limited number of commercial crossings and tight restrictions imposed on a broad range of essential goods, including fuel, paper and cement, permitted to enter the territory has resulted in the suspension of badly needed infrastructure projects being undertaken by UNRWA and interfered with the delivery of vital emergency aid.

21. The humanitarian problems faced by the Palestinian refugees today must be addressed as a shared international responsibility pending a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in accordance with international law, including relevant United Nations resolutions. The services provided by UNRWA must be viewed as the minimum required to enable the refugees to lead productive lives. Any reduction in those services, in combination with the constantly increasing number of the refugees, would not only unfairly deprive them of the minimum level of support to which they are entitled, but could also have a destabilizing effect on the entire region. Above all, the Working Group expresses the hope that the international support for UNRWA embodied in the resolutions adopted each year by the General Assembly, in which the Assembly recognizes the importance of the work of the Agency, will be translated in practice into increased support to ensure the continuation of the Agency on a sound financial basis.

22. The Working Group strongly urges all Governments to bear in mind the foregoing considerations when deciding upon the level of their contributions to UNRWA for 2008 and 2009, and once again:

(a) Urges those Governments that have not yet contributed to UNRWA to do so on a regular basis;

(b) Urges Governments that have so far made only relatively small contributions or else contributions that have not kept up with increased needs to raise the level of their support;

(c) Urges Governments that in the past have made generous contributions to UNRWA to continue to do so in a timely manner and to strive to increase them;

(d) Urges Governments that traditionally have shown special interest in the welfare of the Palestine refugees, both in the region and beyond, to begin contributing to UNRWA or to increase their contributions;

(e) Urges Governments to fully fund UNRWA's budget for the biennium 2008-2009, ensure that the real value of contributions to the Agency is maintained, and ensure that donor support of emergency-related and special programmes does not in any way decrease or divert contributions to its regular programme;

(f) Urges donor Governments, where possible, to provide multi-year funding to allow UNRWA to better plan its activities.

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 20
The situation in Central America: progress in fashioning a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development

Letter dated 18 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to address you concerning the provisional agenda of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly and, specifically, agenda item 20 on "the situation in Central America: progress in fashioning a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development". As you know, this item remains on the agenda of the Assembly for consideration upon notification by a Member State, in accordance with General Assembly decision 60/508 of 31 October 2005.

Thanks to the progress in consolidating Central America as a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development, no Government has hitherto requested consideration of this item. Furthermore, it has been our policy not to do so, firstly out of concern to streamline the agenda of the General Assembly, and secondly, because, in practice, no reason for such a request had arisen.

On this occasion, we wish to bring to the attention of the General Assembly a very specific matter that, in our view, remains pending. In its resolution 58/239, adopted on 23 December 2003, the General Assembly "[t]akes note with satisfaction of the intention of the Government of Guatemala to establish a Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security Apparatuses, and urges the Secretary-General to support that initiative with a view to its prompt implementation". Almost four years passed before this initiative was carried out, and in the most recent report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the situation in Central America, dated 11 August 2005 (A/60/218), it was stated in paragraph 32 that the initiative had not been carried out because it had failed to achieve parliamentary ratification in Guatemala but that "... the Government announced that it would promote a new agreement to address impunity".

In September 2007, after lengthy negotiations, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was established by the Government of Guatemala, in association with the United Nations and with the full support of the Guatemalan Congress.

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In that respect, my Government considers it timely to inform the General Assembly of the commitments met and achievements made in this matter, not only in order to implement resolution 58/239 but because we believe that this initiative is of general interest to United Nations Member States.

I therefore respectfully request that you take this note as the notification referred to in decision 60/508 so that the CICIG can be considered in plenary at the sixty-third session, based on a report by the Secretary-General under agenda item 20. I also request that you have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) Gert **Rosenthal**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/63/377

General Assembly

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 8
General debate

Letter dated 24 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to forward, attached hereto, the statement of the delegation of the Republic of Serbia in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made by Bamir Topi, President of the Republic of Albania, in his statement at the general debate on 24 September 2008 (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 8.

(*Signed*) Pavle **Jevremović**
Permanent Representative

08-52346 (E) 260908

Annex to the letter dated 24 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

The President of the Republic of Albania, Mr. Bamir Topi, said in his statement in the General Debate on 24 September 2008 that "... an independent and democratic Kosovo ... presents the example of the most successful investment made by the international community towards the implementation of the Rule of Law, to long-term stability, peace and development in the Balkans and beyond".

Nothing could be further from the truth. The attempt to create an independent Kosovo out of a province of Serbia, against its will, coupled with the ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other ethnic groups from Kosovo, is a grave violation of international law and the basic principles on which the United Nations is founded.

Furthermore, instead of providing for long-term stability, peace and development in the Balkans and beyond, the attempted independence of Kosovo is just an introduction into a long period of instability in the Balkans. Those who engineered the attempted independence of Kosovo should know that catering to the aspirations of the most potent nationalism on European soil, the Albanian one, will only create future problems for other countries, replicating in one or the other way cases of Kosovo in them. As indicated in the statement of the President of the Republic of Albania today, Albania will continue to feed and support the irredentist aspirations of ethnic Albanians in other countries. Kosovo is but an initial case.

Finally, if the precedent of creating a new State on the basis of a unilateral declaration of independence, against the will of a country to which this territory belongs is established, it will serve as a blueprint for a number of such attempts in the future. All over the globe. This would be a true effect of the words "and beyond" in the statement of the President of the Republic of Albania.

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Sixty-third session
Agenda item 8
General debate

Letter dated 25 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the written statement of the delegation of the Republic of Cyprus in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made by H.E. Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey, on 23 September 2008, in the General Assembly (see annex).*

I should be most grateful if you could arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 8.

(*Signed*) Minas **Hadjimichael**

* See A/63/PV.5.

08-52376 (E) 290908

Annex

Statement of the delegation of the Republic of Cyrus in exercise of the right of reply to the remarks made by the President of the Republic of Turkey in the general debate of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly on 23 September 2008*

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus welcomes the support that the President of the Republic of Turkey has expressed for the ongoing effort undertaken by the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus within the good offices mission of the United Nations Secretary-General in order to reach a political settlement in Cyprus. At the same time, we would like to clarify that these efforts to reach a political settlement in Cyprus aim at the evolution of the Republic of Cyprus into a bizonal, bicommunal federal State with political equality, as set out in relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This basis of the settlement was agreed upon and recently reaffirmed by the two communities in Cyprus, thus allowing the launch of full-fledged negotiations. The objective of the current negotiation process is to reunify Cyprus through a settlement that serves the interests of Cypriots themselves.

As regards the so-called "unfair isolation" of the Turkish Cypriots that the President of the Republic of Turkey referred to in his statement, I would like to clarify that the economic disparities between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities in Cyprus are the direct result of the ongoing occupation of a substantial part of the island by Turkish troops. Despite the numerous adverse consequences for all Cypriots resulting from the invasion and occupation, the Greek Cypriot community managed to rebuild the Cypriot economy through many sacrifices. With respect particularly to the Turkish Cypriot community, its per capita income now stands at US$ 12,000, hardly reminiscent of any isolation. The Republic of Cyprus continues to support the Turkish Cypriot community with packages of social and financial measures on the domestic level and through financial packages of the European Union on the community level. The Cyprus Government is committed to continuing this support because it considers, inter alia, the economic integration of the two communities on the island to be paramount for the seamless reunification of Cyprus.

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* See A/63/PV.5.

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Sixty-third session
Agenda items 118 and 128

Programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009

Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

"Governance and coordination issues need to be addressed as a priority to strengthen the Department of Safety and Security and to effectively mitigate the security risks facing the United Nations"

Summary

In its resolution 61/263 of 4 April 2007, the General Assembly had requested the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct a comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security. The audit focused on three areas: (a) the structure of the Department of Safety and Security; (b) the recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of Assembly resolution 59/276 of 23 December 2004, by which the Department had been established and (c) the interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat entities, including but not limited to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services concluded that in order to improve and strengthen the Department of Safety and Security and to effectively mitigate the security risks facing the United Nations, a number of critical issues, including governance and coordination, needed to be addressed as a priority. In this regard:

- Stakeholders in the United Nations security management system had voiced concerns regarding the effectiveness of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), which is an advisory body on safety and security. In particular, there were concerns that the Network did not review and promulgate policies in a timely manner and did not adequately reflect the needs of all members, and that the ineffectiveness of the Network might lead to the

08-52443 (E) 161008

disintegration of the United Nations security management system. In the view of OIOS, there is an urgent need to review the functions and structure of the Network in order to address these risks.

- The document entitled "Lines of Reporting, Responsibilities and Administrative Arrangements for Security and Safety Services at Offices Away from Headquarters and Regional Commissions" issued by the Department of Safety and Security in June 2006, is ambiguous and does not clearly delineate the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines of the Department and officials with safety and security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. Also, this document is not consistent with the framework for accountability established for the United Nations security management system. In the opinion of OIOS, these weaknesses lead to diminished accountability and could compromise the safety and security of United Nations staff.

- The absence of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities of divisions and units of the Department of Safety and Security in the areas of crisis management, and policy development and implementation, has caused an apparent redundancy of these functions within Department headquarters.

- The impediments connected to the existing Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, which prevent the Department of Safety and Security from professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system, need to be addressed. These impediments relate to the harmonization of contractual arrangements, establishment of security personnel profiles, and standardization of recruitment practices throughout the United Nations security management system.

- The mechanisms established by the Department of Safety and Security to facilitate interaction, cooperation and coordination between the Department and other Secretariat departments were generally adequate, but coordination mechanisms have not been fully complied with at some duty stations and field locations. Isolated operational failures could have been effectively addressed through proper monitoring by the Department.

OIOS has made a series of recommendations on how to address these as well as other issues identified in the present report.

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 61/263 of 4 April 2007, the General Assembly requested the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct a comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security. The audit focused on three areas: (a) the structure of the Department of Safety and Security; (b) the recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of Assembly resolution 59/276 of 23 December 2004, by which the Department had been established; and (c) the interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat entities, including but not limited to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

2. By its resolution 59/276, section XI, on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, the General Assembly decided to establish the Department of Safety and Security to provide leadership within the United Nations system on matters concerning the safety and security of staff, operations and premises, while stressing that the effective functioning of security operations on a decentralized basis at the country level as proposed by the Secretary-General required a unified capacity for policy, standards, coordination, communication, compliance and threat and risk assessment.

3. The resource requirements of the Department of Safety and Security for the biennium 2006-2007 under the regular budget were $171.7 million (before re-costing). This amount included the United Nations share of the jointly financed[1] safety and security costs totalling $40.6 million. According to the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007, the Department has 1,645 established regular budget posts, of which 847 are jointly financed. These posts are located at United Nations Headquarters in New York, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and field locations throughout the world.

II. Governance and overall coordination of security matters

4. Governance and coordination issues need to be addressed as a priority to strengthen the Department of Safety and Security and to effectively mitigate the security risks facing the United Nations. In section XI of its resolution 59/276, the General Assembly identified several imperatives, through:

(a) Stressing that the effective functioning, at the country level, of security operations on a decentralized basis required a unified capacity for policy, standards, coordination, communication, compliance and threat and risk assessment;

(b) Recognizing the need for the urgent implementation of a unified and strengthened security management system;

(c) Emphasizing that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations staff and premises rested with the host country;

[1] Certain costs for safety and security are jointly financed, based on a cost-sharing formula endorsed by the General Assembly, by participating organizations of the United Nations security management system including the United Nations system agencies, programmes and funds and the Secretariat, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

(d) Recognizing the importance of achieving the highest levels of professionalism and expertise within the United Nations security management system.

An organigram of the Department of Safety and Security and the security management system is contained in the annex to the present report.

A. Role of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network in supporting a unified security management system

5. To address the needs of the United Nations organizations that constitute the unified security management system envisaged by the mandate of the Department of Safety and Security, the Department has relied upon the already existing framework for the development and implementations of policies. According to the United Nations Field Security Handbook (2006 ed.),[2] which the Department considers to be the comprehensive policy document for the United Nations security management system, the framework for developing the policies of the United Nations security management system includes the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, which is chaired by the Department and reports to the High-level Committee on Management of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. The Network was established effective January 2002 during the time of operation of the now defunct Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to review policies governing the security operations of the United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes in the field. Since 2005, the Network's role has been expanded to include the review of all existing and proposed safety and security policies, procedures and practices of the entities of the United Nations security management system.

6. It is noteworthy that the Inter-Agency Security Management Network has no decision-making power per se, as it is required to submit all policy recommendations to the High-level Committee on Management, which decides on them and advises the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination on how they should be implemented. A risk assessment by OIOS of the Department of Safety and Security conducted subsequent to the audit highlighted stakeholders' concerns regarding the effectiveness of the Network. In particular, there was a concern that policies were not being reviewed and promulgated in a timely manner, and that the policies did not adequately reflect the needs of all members of the Network. Also as highlighted in paragraphs 8 to 10 and 43 of the present report, there is a lack of clarity regarding the status of the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, both of the United Nations Secretariat, in the Network. There was a further concern that the ineffectiveness of the Network might lead to disintegration of the United Nations security management system. In the view of OIOS, there is an urgent need to review the functions and structure of the Network in order to address these risks.

[2] This edition of the United Nations Field Security Handbook includes the approved framework for accountability that existed during the time of operation of the former Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. The revised framework for accountability, which was taken note of by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/263 of 4 April 2007, was transmitted by the Department of Safety and Security in April 2007 to all officials with safety and security responsibilities.

B. Conformity of the Department of Safety and Security with the framework for policy development

7. At its April 2005 meeting, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network had noted that, given the existence of a worldwide threat, the differentiation between Headquarters and field locations from a security perspective was no longer valid. Accordingly, the Network reviewed the United Nations Field Security Handbook, which describes the roles and responsibilities of Chief Security Advisers who are also the heads of safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. In addition, in March 2007, the Network reviewed and agreed upon the policy document entitled "United Nations Security Management System Arrangements for Headquarters Locations", which pertains specifically to Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. However, the Department of Safety and Security itself did not always adhere to the requirement that all policies should be reviewed by the Network with regard to some policies covering the safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. At the time of the audit, the Department had been working on 13 priority policy areas for the safety and security services, including career development, early retirement, and weapons-related policies. The Department believed that those policies were internal to the Department and fell outside the purview of the Network. In the view of OIOS, this contradicted the concept of a unified capacity for policy.

C. Safety and security policies for Secretariat departments

8. The focal points for safety and security at the organizations constituting the United Nations security management system are responsible for liaising with the Department of Safety and Security and the Inter-Agency Security Management Network on all policy and procedural matters. Although the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had been divided into two departments in early 2007, namely, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, as of the date of the audit, the Department of Field Support had yet to appoint a focal point. Consequently, the focal point for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who was appointed prior to the reorganization, also serves as the de facto focal point for the Department of Field Support.

9. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations informed OIOS that its views had not been properly considered by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and that its participation in the Network had not sufficiently impacted on the policy debate of the United Nations security management system. Therefore, it believed that the policies of the Network had not addressed the unique circumstances and needs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. For example, uniformed personnel (that is to say, military observers and civilian police), who are neither civilian staff under the Staff Rules nor part of the military contingents in peacekeeping missions, are currently not covered by the United Nations security management system. In the view of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Network, which was established prior to the creation of the Department of Safety and Security, continues to focus primarily on the needs of the United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes.

10. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations stated that it had been invited to attend the plenary sessions of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network but, as indicated in paragraph 43, had not attended any meetings since 2005 and its status in the Network had still not been clarified. The Department noted that Network activities were not limited to the plenary sessions because working groups met prior to the Network plenary sessions to identify key issues and decide the Network agenda and strategies. The Department is not a party to these working groups and has therefore been able to influence neither the Network agenda nor its strategies.

III. Organizational structure of the Department of Safety and Security

A. Need to formalize the structure of the Department of Safety and Security

11. Primarily owing to long negotiations on the new framework for accountability for the United Nations security management system, issuance of the required Secretary-General's bulletin describing the functions of each unit of the Department of Safety and Security has been delayed. The framework for accountability, which specifies the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the United Nations security management system, including the Department of Safety and Security, was taken note of by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/263. The Department explained that it had delayed the issuance of the Secretary-General's Bulletin on the organization of the Department pending the approval of the framework for accountability. However, at the time of the audit, the publication of the bulletin had been further delayed pending a decision by the General Assembly on the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, which included a proposal by the Department for the establishment of a new crisis management capacity in the Department of Safety and Security.

12. OIOS notes that the reports of the Secretary-General (A/59/365 and Corr.1 and Add.1/Corr.1) on a strengthened and unified security management system of the United Nations had been among the impetuses for the adoption by the General Assembly of section XI of its resolution 59/276, by which the Department of Safety and Security was established. Although a more comprehensive review of the structure of the Department by a dedicated change management expert had been envisaged, as indicated in paragraph 14 of document A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1, the Department informed OIOS that its structure was based solely on the recommendations contained in the aforementioned reports of the Secretary-General, which in turn had been based on the comprehensive study of security requirements conducted by a specialized security firm recruited by the Department of Management and supervised by the Deputy Secretary-General. The Department of Safety and Security stated that it had tried, but failed, to obtain the report of the comprehensive study of security requirements conducted by the specialized security firm. However, the Department of Management informed OIOS that all records pertaining to safety and security had been provided to the Department of Safety and Security upon its creation.

13. The structure of the Department of Safety and Security, which has yet to be set out in a Secretary-General's bulletin, includes the major organizational units and capacities authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/276. In particular, in that resolution the Assembly subsumed the security management components of the office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Safety and Security Service at Headquarters, the security services at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, and the civilian security component of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into a single security management framework. As at the time of the audit, the structure of the Department of Safety and Security included the Office of the Under-Secretary-General, including the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit and the Executive Office; the Division of Regional Operations, including the Office of the Director, Threat and Risk Capacity, the Operations Section, the Communications Centre, the five regional desks and one peacekeeping desk, and the Field Security Operations; the Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services,[3] including Headquarters Security and Safety Services and Security and Safety Services at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions; and Field Support Services, including the Critical Incident Stress Management Unit and the Training and Development Section.

14. In the view of OIOS, the delay in formalizing the structure provides the Department of Safety and Security with the opportunity to reassess how it could be more appropriately structured in order to effectively and efficiently respond to its mandate. As discussed directly below, in conducting the assessment, the Department must consider the need to: (a) clearly delineate its roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis those of Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions (paras. 15-17); (b) clarify the responsibilities and lines of reporting of Chief Security Advisers at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations (paras. 18-19); (c) clarify the roles and responsibilities of the divisions and units within the Department (paras. 20-24); and (d) realign as warranted the staffing levels of the current structure (paras. 25-27).

B. Need for clarity in roles and responsibilities of Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions

15. Prior to the establishment of the new framework for accountability, the Department of Safety and Security, in June 2006, had issued a document entitled "Lines of Reporting, Responsibilities and Administrative Arrangements for Security and Safety Services at Offices Away from Headquarters and Regional Commissions". While the framework for accountability discusses the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the United Nations security management system, the document on "Lines of Reporting, Responsibilities and Administrative Arrangements" specifically addresses offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. At the time of the audit, the Department of Safety and Security and concerned officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions

[3] The programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 identifies this division as the Division of Security and Safety Services, whereas the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 identifies it as the Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services.

were using this document as the source of guidelines/standard operating procedures for reporting and assignment of responsibilities.

16. In the opinion of OIOS, the content of this document is ambiguous and creates confusion. The document states that the Designated Official is responsible for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met at the duty station but it also says that it is the Department of Safety and Security that is responsible for "ensuring implementation for the security aspects of United Nations activities". The document also states that the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security is responsible for the overall safety of United Nations civilian personnel but then goes on to say that the Under-Secretary-General shares responsibility for security with the Designated Official at the duty station. It is not made clear how this "sharing" of responsibility should be achieved.

17. The Department of Safety and Security acknowledged that the document was ambiguous and did not clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the Department and officials with safety and security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. In the opinion of OIOS, ambiguity in establishing responsibilities for safety and security leads to diminished accountability and compromises the safety and security of United Nations staff. The Department should therefore ensure that any revisions made to the document are aligned to the framework for accountability of the United Nations security management system.

C. Need for clarity in lines of reporting of the Chief Security Adviser at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations

18. The Chief Security Adviser is the security professional appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security to advise the Designated Official and the Security Management Team on their security functions at the duty station. In this advisory capacity, the Chief Security Adviser reports both to the Designated Official and to the Department of Safety and Security. The Chief Security Adviser also heads the Security and Safety Service at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, and in integrated missions,[4] is responsible for managing the Security Section of the peacekeeping/special political mission. In this operational capacity, the Chief Security Adviser reports to the Designated Official and to the Department.

19. The Chief Security Adviser also reports to the Department of Safety and Security because the Department is responsible for his/her technical supervision and for providing policy direction and operational guidance; however, the nature and scope of technical supervision, policy direction and operational guidance were not sufficiently clear. For example, the meaning of "technical supervision" varied depending on who interpreted the expression. Ambiguity regarding the responsibility of the Department for the technical supervision, direction and operational guidance of the Chief Security Adviser had caused tension between the

[4] An integrated mission is one that has a Country Team comprising United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes, and a peacekeeping mission under the overall authority of a single Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Chief Security Adviser and the Designated Official at one of the offices away from Headquarters. Eventually, the Department reassigned the Chief Security Adviser. However, this does not resolve the bigger issue regarding lack of clarity on policy and operational matters, and on the reporting lines of the Chief Security Adviser, which needs to be addressed.

D. Need for clarity in the functions of the units within the Department of Safety and Security structure

20. The following specific examples relating to crisis management capacity and policy development and implementation capacity indicate the need for further clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the divisions and units in the Department of Safety and Security in order to prevent possible overlap/duplication of functions and inefficient use of resources in the areas of policy development, implementation, crisis management and field support.

Crisis management capacity

21. Under the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, the Department of Safety and Security received seven additional posts for establishing crisis management capacity in the form of a unit within the Field Support Service. This Crisis Management Unit is responsible for information management, for coordinating the establishment of procedures, policies and agreements and for augmenting the existing Communications Centre of the Division of Regional Operations during crises.

22. The Crisis Management Unit adds to a number of existing but separate units and organs with crisis management capacities. At the time of the audit, the existing organs and units with certain crisis management responsibilities included (a) the Communications Centre with seven General Service staff; (b) the Crisis Management Unit within the Safety and Security Service in New York with five staff; and (c) specifically designated field surge capacity in 15 locations for crisis response in the field which could be mobilized to a crisis zone in case of need. The Department of Safety and Security concurred that all crisis management units needed to be merged.

Policy development and implementation

23. According to the report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/61/531):

(a) The Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services are responsible for updating security and safety guidelines and directives and for "coordinating the standardization of safety and security policies and monitoring their implementation", respectively. However, these responsibilities should fall under the purview of the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, which reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security;

(b) The Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services are responsible for monitoring the implementation of established security and safety policies, although this falls within the purview of the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit.

24. The Department of Safety and Security informed OIOS that policy development and monitoring are peripheral to the Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services. However, this fact is not clarified in the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/531) or in any other official document.

E. Staffing levels of the current structure

25. According to document A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1, security and safety services specialists had been engaged to conduct an external validation of the staffing proposals across duty stations, using industry best practices and the Headquarters minimum operating security standards. As indicated in paragraph 12 above, the report of the security and safety services specialists could not be located by the Department of Safety and Security and thus OIOS could not review it.

26. Regarding the posts for field security personnel that are jointly financed by participating organizations in the United Nations security management system, the Department of Safety and Security acknowledged that the "initial requirements were not based on any formal risk and threat assessment but were the result of discussions held by the consultant on an inter-agency basis to determine where security personnel were required as well as how many security officers were needed at each location". Contrary to this assertion, however, among the conclusions of the ninth session of the High-level Committee on Management (4 and 5 April 2005) was the following:

> Organizations reiterated their concern about the lack of consultation during the process that had led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 59/276. This had resulted in a lack of critical financial information at the time of preparation of the budgets of the organizations and in the consequent difficulty that they would face in providing coverage for security costs that were subject to cost-sharing (see CEB/2005/3, para. 15).

27. There was no indication that the required additional posts for the Headquarters units of the Department of Safety and Security such as: the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit; Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit; Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit; Training and Development Section; Critical Incident Stress Management Unit; and the regional desks were validated by the security and safety services specialists or based on any benchmarking practice.

IV. Human resources management

28. In its resolution 59/276 establishing the Department of Safety and Security, the General Assembly had stressed the importance of professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system. The Department informed OIOS that it considered harmonization of contractual arrangements, establishment of profiles, and standardization of recruitment practices throughout the United Nations security management system to be critical for fully addressing the goals expressed in resolution 59/276. In its resolution 61/263, the Assembly had requested OIOS to conduct a management audit of, inter alia, recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of

Assembly resolution 59/276. In this context, OIOS reviewed whether the Department had implemented section XI regarding the recruitment procedures that would professionalize and create a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system.

A. Harmonization of contractual arrangements

29. As of the date of this audit, the issue of harmonization of contractual arrangements had been unresolved. In addition, there are no rules and administrative instructions on the redeployment of locally recruited security personnel across duty stations. As shown in the table below, there are five categories of personnel performing security functions under different contractual arrangements. These differences are accounted for by, inter alia, appointments under different series of Staff Rules, and pertain as well to the post classifications for security personnel performing similar functions, as well as to the organizations issuing the contracts.

Status of the five different categories of security personnel

Types of security personnel	*In Department of Safety and Security staffing table*	*Supervised by Department of Safety and Security*	*Organization issuing the contract*	*Local recruits (series of staff Rules/category)*	*International recruits (series of Staff Rules/category)*
Security personnel at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions	Yes	Yes	United Nations Secretariat	Security Service (SS), General Service (GS)	100 series: Professional (P)
Field security personnel	Yes	Yes	United Nations Development Programme	100 series: GS	200 series: Project Personnel (L)
Department of Peacekeeping Operations mission- appointed security personnel	No	Yes[a]	United Nations Secretariat	300 series: GS	300 series: P, Field Service (FS)
Single-agency security personnel	No	No	United Nations system agencies, programmes and funds	Unknown	Unknown
Non-United Nations security personnel (outsourced security services)	No	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

[a] Department of Safety and Security-supervised Department of Peacekeeping Operations mission-appointed security personnel at integrated United Nations missions but not at non-integrated missions.

30. The Department of Safety and Security stated that the differences in contractual arrangements impeded the redeployment of security personnel between duty stations. The Department also believed that differences in the conditions of service of security officers, primarily owing to differences in sources of funding, could affect the morale of security personnel and potentially derail the concept of an integrated security management system. In the Department's view, the provisions of

General Assembly resolution 59/276, which stressed the importance of professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system, pertain to all categories of security personnel, including those locally recruited and classified at the Security Service and General Service levels.

31. During the past three years, the Department of Safety and Security has taken a number of steps to address the issue of harmonization of conditions of service without success, since the General Assembly has not decided on this issue. For example, in 2005, the Department had initiated a review process with the Office of Human Resources Management, the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. In 2006, the Department again raised this issue through the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly (A/61/531). The Assembly in its resolution 62/248 of 3 April 2008 decided that the continued consideration of the harmonization of conditions of service was necessary and would be a matter of priority at its sixty-third session, with a view to implementing the new contractual arrangements and conditions by 1 July 2009.

32. The Department of Safety and Security stated that it anticipated a resolution of the issue concerning harmonization of conditions of service through the ongoing human resources management reforms under the purview of the Department of Management. However, although the human resources management reforms propose the appointment of United Nations staff under one series of Staff Rules, OIOS believes that this will not fully eliminate the current impediments to redeploying security personnel across different duty stations. For instance, the human resources management reforms will not address the mobility issue for locally recruited staff as well as for internationally recruited security personnel holding United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contracts.

33. The staff selection system of the United Nations Secretariat (see administrative instruction ST/AI/2006/3 of 15 November 2006) considers individuals with UNDP contracts external candidates irrespective of whether they apply for a lateral move or for a promotion. Therefore, the internationally recruited security personnel, who are on the staffing table of the Department of Safety and Security and consequently should be considered Secretariat staff, may be at a disadvantage when applying for vacancies at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, because they are external candidates by virtue of their UNDP contract.

34. Currently, there are no rules or administrative instructions governing the redeployment of locally recruited staff across duty stations of the Secretariat. To move to another duty station, locally recruited security personnel must resign from their parent duty station and retake the entry test for the desired duty station, which impedes their mobility.

35. Consequently, a new set of rules for locally recruited security personnel is needed to address the mobility requirements. To achieve this, the Secretariat may consider using the Security Service post category to distinguish the locally recruited security personnel from other locally recruited administrative staff members. Currently, the Security Service level is used only for locally recruited security personnel in New York. Locally recruited security personnel at other duty stations

are under the General Service category, which has a salary scale different from that for the Security Service category.

B. New profile of security personnel

36. Nearly three years after the request of the General Assembly, the profile of security personnel remains incomplete. To date, the Department of Safety and Security has drafted a profile only for the next generation of internationally recruited security personnel at field locations in August 2007; it has yet to establish a new profile for all other categories of security personnel. The draft profile for internationally recruited security personnel outlines the recruitment strategy, entry requirements and career path, including tour of duty to be undertaken, before the security personnel can be considered for promotion.

37. The Department of Safety and Security explained that it had been unable to complete the profile for security personnel at all levels primarily because its main focus had been the filling of new posts authorized by the General Assembly. The Department also stated that it had focused on the profile of the internationally recruited field security personnel because redeployment within that group was possible, since all security personnel in this group held UNDP contracts. The Department believes that until the contractual arrangements for security personnel throughout the United Nations security management system are harmonized, it is of little use to prepare profiles for other categories of security personnel, including the safety and security personnel at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and peacekeeping and special political missions, and agency-specific security personnel.

38. The Department of Safety and Security has no authority to harmonize contractual arrangements of security personnel throughout the United Nations security management system. However, it is within the Department's purview to propose a new profile of security personnel at all levels focusing primarily on recruitment strategy and entry requirements.

C. Recruitment standards

39. The recruitment standards established by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for the field security personnel (see table) have not been consistently applied throughout the United Nations security management system. In reviewing the 2007 vacancy announcements, OIOS found that the required minimum years of relevant experience for security personnel at Headquarters and for security personnel at offices away from Headquarters were the same but that the minimum years of required relevant experience for security personnel in the field were significantly higher. For example, the experience requirement for an L-4 in the field was 12 years, whereas the experience requirement for a P-5 at Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters was only 10 years.

40. The Department of Safety and Security explained that the experience requirements for the field positions were based on recruitment standards established by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, while the experience requirements for comparable posts at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions were based on the classification guidelines of the United

Nations Secretariat. However, OIOS also found that the Department had not always complied with the recruitment standards established by the Network for field positions. For instance, the Network requires a minimum of 16 years experience for an L-5, but the Department of Safety and Security had indicated a requirement of only 15 years experience in a recent vacancy announcement. On the other hand, for an L-4, the Network requires 10 years for a candidate with a master's degree, but the Department had advertised in its vacancy announcement that a minimum of 12 years experience was required for candidates with an advanced/master's degree.

D. Training

41. In 2006 and 2007, the Training and Development Section of the Department of Safety and Security had trained mainly security professionals and managers with security responsibilities. During the past three years, out of the 20 training standards developed by the Training and Development Section, the Section delivered training on 6. While the Section was relying on the training components at the field and Headquarters duty stations to deliver the training, it was not monitoring the activities conducted by these training components. Consequently, the Training and Development Section was not in a position to ascertain whether all security personnel had been adequately trained using the common training standards.

V. Interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments

A. Interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments at Headquarters

42. OIOS considers the interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments at Headquarters to be generally adequate. For example, there is a Standing Committee comprising the Under-Secretaries-General of the Department of Safety and Security, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Department of Field Support which meets regularly to discuss issues connected with security. Senior management officials of both the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the Department of Safety and Security confirmed that they did collaborate during the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process used for mobilizing resources for humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that safety and security aspects were properly reflected in the Consolidated Appeals Process. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Safety and Security officials also confirmed that they were cooperating on an ongoing project that would ensure security coverage for Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs clientele in the field security system that were not currently covered by the United Nations security management system, that is to say, the non-governmental organizations.

43. However, the Department of Safety and Security informed OIOS that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, and the

Department of Political Affairs had not participated in the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. The Department of Field Support had not yet appointed a security focal point, while the Department of Political Affairs had only recently appointed a new one. The present Department of Peacekeeping Operations security focal point is leaving for another duty station; thus, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations needs to appoint a replacement. The focal points are supposed to represent their respective departments in the meetings of the Network; thus, timely appointment of the focal point is important. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has participated in only one meeting of the Network since the creation of the Department of Safety and Security. As indicated in paragraph 10, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations focal point believed the Network had not sufficiently addressed the concerns of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the proposed policies.

B. Interaction, cooperation and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations

44. Interaction, cooperation and coordination between the Department of Safety and Security and offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations should occur in accordance with the following mechanisms:

(a) At offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, the Designated Official for security chairs the Senior Management Group comprising Executive Directors or the equivalent for United Nations organizations having their headquarters or a stand-alone office in the same country. The Senior Management Group should meet once a year and should be convened in the case of impending crisis or serious security developments. At other field locations, the Department of Safety and Security-appointed Designated Official for security chairs the Security Management Team consisting of representatives of heads of agencies at the field location. The Security Management Teams should meet regularly to discuss and make decisions on safety and security issues at the field location;

(b) The Chief Security Adviser to the Designated Official for security should report periodically to the Department of Safety and Security on operational and administrative matters. At offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, the Chief Security Adviser chairs the Security Advisory Group comprising security focal points. The Security Advisory Group should act as an advisory body to the Senior Management Group and meet regularly to consider issues related to security policies and operations, facilitate coordination and information dissemination, and formulate recommendations to the Senior Management Group. At other field locations, the Chief Security Adviser chairs the Security Cells comprising single-agency security officials at those field locations.

45. In the opinion of OIOS, the above-described mechanisms, if functioning as intended, are adequate to provide interaction, coordination and cooperation of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations. To ensure that the mechanisms work as intended, they must be periodically verified. The Department has a Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit which, in the view of OIOS, should be used to identify and report any non-compliance with the

established mechanisms that may impact on security operations. The Unit only recently received its full complement of staff, and has started identifying appropriate modalities for its compliance visits. The work planning process for this Unit has not been structured so as to properly identify the nature, timing and extent of compliance visits. There is no planning cycle; and the workplan is determined based on informal consultations held by the Unit with Department officials. With the appropriate modalities, the Unit should have been able to identify, in a more timely manner, the following conditions identified by OIOS, which indicated ineffective interaction, ineffective cooperation and ineffective coordination at some offices away from Headquarters and field locations:

(a) At one office away from Headquarters, the Designated Official for safety and security informed OIOS that owing to unresolved issues regarding his authority over other heads of United Nations organizations at that duty station, it was difficult for him to convene meetings of the Senior Management Group.

(b) Primarily owing to difficulties experienced by the Designated Official at another office away from Headquarters in convening a formal meeting of heads of organizations at that duty station, the required meetings of the Senior Management Group were held informally. Since records of the meetings of this Group are not maintained, it might be difficult for the Secretary-General to assign accountability for non-compliance of this Group with safety and security policies;

(c) At one peacekeeping mission, the Chief Security Adviser disagreed with the Chief of the Joint Operations Centre on whether the staff at the Centre should receive direct tasking from their parent organization. Security officers at the mission have inadequate experience and training, and the Chief Security Adviser also indicated that there were weaknesses with respect to the regional Security Management Teams. Communications remained a problem across many duty stations: training on use of communications equipment was inadequate and some communications equipment was not functioning properly at this mission;

(d) Another peacekeeping mission confirmed that no exercise had been carried out to test the Security Evacuation Plan. The warden system in this mission was not operational mainly owing to the incompleteness of the security section database on residential information, a situation further compounded by the large number of staff involved;

(e) In another peacekeeping mission, the operating procedures used were outdated, Area Security Coordinators were not adequately trained, and the guidelines provided to wardens were inadequate;

(f) In yet another peacekeeping mission, the Security Cell was not established; security and crisis management training was not provided to some agency members in the Security Management Team; the warden system was not operating efficiently and effectively because it operated on a voluntary basis and no one wanted to take this responsibility; and there had been a lack of exchange of information during a crisis involving the host country in March 2007, as a result of which the host country did not inform or protect United Nations staff;

(g) Different radio frequencies of the handsets used in two peacekeeping missions hampered communication among the security personnel;

(h) The Designated Official of one peacekeeping mission complained of the lack of a clear chain of command for the Chief Security Adviser and of his lack of control over Chief Security Advisers because they were Department of Safety and Security staff.

VI. Recommendations

46. OIOS issued 16 recommendations to the Department of Safety and Security to improve the Organization's security structure and its responsiveness to the security environment. Several of the recommendations may have budgetary implications for the United Nations. **As a general observation, the Department of Management advised that any of the recommendations that involved restructuring or additional resources must be reviewed and analysed in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and presented to the General Assembly for its consideration.** Comments made by the Department of Safety and Security in response to the recommendations are presented in bold.

Recommendation 1

47. The Department of Safety and Security should initiate a review of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network mechanism to assess whether it is functioning effectively and efficiently, and is fulfilling the needs of the organizations of the United Nations security management system. The results of this review should be presented to the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination through the High-level Committee on Management.

48. **The Department of Safety and Security responded that the Inter-Agency Security Management Network comprises representatives from United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes who report to their governing bodies and therefore any review of the Network must be conducted through the High-level Committee on Management/United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. According to the Department, while it is part of the United Nations security management system, the Department is not mandated to conduct a review on its own. Nevertheless, the Department advised that the High-level Committee on Management had established a Steering Group on 27 August 2008, which was discussing recommendation 1, and a security management system-wide response was being generated. The Department will communicate to OIOS the outcome of the Steering Group's decision on how to take the recommendation forward.**

Recommendation 2

49. The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that all proposed policies for safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions are submitted to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for consideration. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation stating that it would ensure that all policies pertaining to the United Nations security management system were considered by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.**

Recommendation 3

50. The Department of Safety and Security should review and clarify, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, the role of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in policy development and address the reasons why they have not attended the meetings of the Network. In particular, the Department should address whether the unified security management network system adequately covers all types of personnel under the responsibility of these Departments.

51. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation stating that it acknowledged the leadership role that it played in ensuring the safety and security of staff, operations and premises. In addition, the Department stated that it had been assured by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs that focal points would be designated and required to attend the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. According to the Department of Management, the addition of other types of personnel such as uniformed personnel (for example, military police and civilian police) to the security management network may add substantial costs to the United Nations and may form a precedent for other personnel to be included. Any addition of these personnel would also have ramifications for the cost-sharing arrangements agreed to by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.** Therefore, in the opinion of OIOS, the Department of Safety and Security should perform appropriate analyses to determine the cost implications of implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation 4

52. The Department of Safety and Security should, based on its three years of experience and using the report commissioned by the Department of Management on the comprehensive study of security requirements and other relevant studies, reassess its structure in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. Based on the results of the reassessment, it should finalize and publish the Secretary-General's bulletin describing the organization of the Department of Safety and Security, including the functions of its divisions and units.

53. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it intended to reassess its structure in the context of the upcoming security review. Pursuant to the conclusions of the review, the Department of Safety and Security will proceed to finalize the Secretary-General's bulletin. The Department of Management commented that any restructuring/reorganization of the Department of Safety and Security would need to be considered in the light of any changes recommended in the report to the General Assembly on the independent review of United Nations security that evaluated the strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of the security of United Nations personnel and premises. Any changes as approved by the Assembly would form the basis of the changes to the Secretary-General's bulletin.**

Recommendation 5

54. The Department of Safety and Security should initiate appropriate operational procedures/guidelines for consideration by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and approval by the High-level Committee on Management, clarifying the role and responsibilities of the Department and the Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and the regional commissions. Any clarifications should be aligned to the framework for accountability, as appropriate.

55. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation, stating that the current arrangements with the Designated Officials at the offices away from Headquarters and the regional commissions needed to be revisited and that this would be carried out in the context of the upcoming security review.**

Recommendation 6

56. The Department of Safety and Security should clarify the objectives and scope of the Department's technical supervision, policy direction and operational guidance provided to the Chief Security Advisers at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations and should reassess, on this basis, the reporting lines of the Chief Security Adviser.

57. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would be carried out in the context of the upcoming security review. In addition to a review of the arrangements with the Designated Officials, there will be a reassessment of the Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser reporting lines.**

Recommendation 7

58. The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that the merging of Secretariat resources dealing with crisis management into a proposed Department Crisis Management Unit is based on a clear crisis management strategy developed in consultation with participating members of the United Nations security management system.

59. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that all crisis management resources within the Department would be merged to make the most effective use of the resources. In connection with this recommendation, the Department of Management noted that, while the Department of Safety and Security had a crisis management capacity, there also existed a peacekeeping situation centre and a Business Continuity Management Unit within the Office of Central Support Services which managed business continuity including after a crisis, and that these had not been merged within the Department of Safety and Security.** In implementing this recommendation, the Department of Safety and Security, in consultation with the Department of Management and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, should consider the need to incorporate these capacities within the Department of Safety and Security.

Recommendation 8

60. When reassessing its structure, the Department of Safety and Security should clearly identify the major functions of its divisions and units including the Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services; the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit; the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit; and, if and when established, the new Crisis Management Unit.

61. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that the roles and responsibilities would be reassessed in the context of the upcoming security review.**

Recommendation 9

62. The Department of Safety and Security should, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, reassess its current staffing levels using industry best practices and standards, and the report of the consultant commissioned by the Department of Management, which is referred to in documents A/59/365 and Corr.1 and A/59/365/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1.

63. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it intended to reassess its current staffing levels in the context of the upcoming security review. The Department of Management commented that any change to the structure or staffing levels of the Department of Safety and Security must be considered by the General Assembly.**

Recommendation 10

64. The Department of Safety and Security should request the Office of Human Resources Management to review the feasibility of harmonizing the contractual arrangements of locally recruited security personnel in order to facilitate the introduction of rules to address the mobility requirements of these personnel.

65. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would present a proposal to the Office of Human Resources Management for consideration. According to the Department of Management, the proposed introduction of one series of Staff Rules (see the report of the Secretary-General on detailed proposals for streamlining United Nations contractual arrangements (A/62/274)) would resolve the Department of Safety and Security-related issue of some professional staff's serving under different sets of Staff Rules. However, it will not eliminate the current impediments to contract harmonization for field staff on United Nations Development Programme contracts and impediments to mobility of these contract-holders and locally employed security staff. The Department of Management also noted that the proposal of the Department of Safety and Security presented to the Office of Human Resources Management for eliminating the impediments to contract harmonization for field staff on United Nations Development Programme contracts and impediments to mobility of these contract-holders and locally employed security staff might have budgetary implications and could create a precedent for the wider General Service, as security staff in most duty stations were part of this category. Therefore, any proposal in this regard should be closely analysed by the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts.**

Recommendation 11

66. The Department of Safety and Security should perform a detailed analysis of the impediments to deploying security personnel between duty stations, consider the extent to which the United Nations human resources management reforms would address such impediments, and identify solutions for the remaining impediments.

67. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would conduct the analysis, taking into account any developments that might arise in relation to the ongoing General Assembly review of contractual arrangements and conditions of service for field staff.**

Recommendation 12

68. The Department of Safety and Security should complete a new profile of security personnel for all levels focusing on recruitment strategy and entry requirements.

69. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it was in the process of finalizing a new profile for security personnel at all levels.**

Recommendation 13

70. The Department of Safety and Security should take the lead role in coordinating the harmonization of recruitment standards for security personnel across the United Nations security management system.

71. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would coordinate and harmonize recruitment standards for all security personnel in the Department. The Department will present a proposal to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for harmonization of recruitment standards for all security personnel across the United Nations security management system. However, implementation of any standard will remain the prerogative of each agency, fund and programme.**

Recommendation 14

72. The Department of Safety and Security should monitor whether, and ensure that, all security personnel are adequately trained in accordance with the established common training standards and have the capability to perform their functions, particularly in their capacity to respond effectively to security crises.

73. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would implement the recommendation by January 2009.**

Recommendation 15

74. The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support appoint security focal points as soon as practicable and facilitate their participation, as well as that of the Department of Political Affairs, in the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.

75. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation, stating that it had been assured by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs that focal points would be designated and required to attend the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network.**

Recommendation 16

76. The Department of Safety and Security should establish a formal risk assessment and planning process in order to enhance its ability to promptly identify, report and correct non-compliance with established mechanisms for interaction, cooperation and coordination.

77. **The Department of Safety and Security accepted this recommendation and stated that it would be implemented by October 2008.**

(*Signed*) Inga-Britt **Ahlenius**
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services

Annex

Organigram of the Department of Safety and Security of the United Nations Secretariat and the security management system


Governance structure
General Assembly/ governing bodies of agencies, funds and programmes
United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination/High-level Committee on Management
Secretary-General
Inter-agency security management network
(Secretariat entities such as Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support and agencies, funds and programmes and other entities such as the World Bank, etc.)
Department of Safety and Security
Under-Secretary-General/ Assistant Secretary-General/ Department of Safety and Security
Division of Regional Operations
Division of Security and Safety Services
Field Support Service
Designated Official
(Resident Representative or Special Representative of the Secretary-General)
Country security structure
Department of Safety and Security Security Officer
(Chief Security Adviser or Security Adviser)
Security Management Team
(Designated Official, Chief Security Adviser and head of each United Nations organization present at the duty station)
Legend
First reporting line
Secondary reporting line
Chairs
Accountable to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security

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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-third year

Identical letters dated 22 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Goverrment, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations committed from 1 to 14 September 2008 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

08-52644 (E) 021008 061008

Annex to the identical letters dated 22 September 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israeli violations, acts of aggression and other activities from 1 to 14 September 2008

Air violations

On 1 September 2008:

- Between 0410 and 0700 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over areas of the South before leaving over Rumaysh;
- Between 1500 and 1700 hours, Israeli enemy warplanes flew intermittently at high altitude over Tibnin, Bint Jubayl and Naqurah.

On 2 September 2008:

- Between 1325 and 1450 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over Bint Jubayl and Nabatiyah;
- Between 1051 and 1600 hours, Israeli enemy warplanes circled over Tibnin and Bint Jubayl;
- Between 2055 and 2140 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over areas of the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 3 September 2008:

- Between 1200 and 1250 hours, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Dayr Mimas. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b;
- At 1938 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b and heading north as far as Nabatiyah. It circled over areas of the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0315 hours on 4 September 2008 over Bint Jubayl.

On 5 September 2008:

- Between 0045 and 0150 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Tyre. It circled over the South before leaving over Rumaysh;
- Between 0600 and 1430 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over areas of the South before leaving over Naqurah;
- Between 1117 and 1205 hours, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b;
- Between 1655 and 1945 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over Bint Jubayl and Tibnin;

- Between 2150 and 2200 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It proceeded as far as Bint Jubayl before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 7 September 2008, between 1405 and 1530 hours, two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 8 September 2008:

- Between 0650 and 0715 hours, Israeli enemy warplanes circled over Bint Jubayl and Tibnin;

- Between 1000 and 1145 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over Bint Jubayl and Tibnin;

- Between 1935 and 2200 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over areas of the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 9 September 2008:

- Between 0700 and 2200 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over areas of the south, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving over the occupied Shab'a Farms;

- Between 1133 and 1200 hours, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving over Naqurah;

- At 2200 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over areas of the South before leaving at 0650 hours on 10 September 2008 over Alma al-Sha'b.

On 10 September 2008, at 1045 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over areas of the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0215 hours on 11 September 2008 over the sea off Naqurah.

On 11 September 2008:

- Between 0125 and 0215 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It proceeded north as far as Damur before returning south and leaving over the sea off Naqurah;

- At 0700 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over areas of the South before leaving at 0500 hours on 12 September 2008 over Alma al-Sha'b;

- Between 1700 and 2000 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over Bint Jubayl and Tibnin.

On 13 September 2008:

- Between 2015 and 2215 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b;

- At 2220 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0400 hours on 14 September 2008 over Rumaysh.

On 14 September 2008:

- Between 1615 and 1745 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over Bint Jubayl and Tibnin;

- Between 1940 and 2055 hours, Israeli enemy warplanes circled over Bint Jubayl and Naqurah;

- Between 2115 and 2345 hours, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over areas of the South before leaving over Rumaysh.

Sea violations

On 12 September 2008, at 0035 hours, in the open sea off Ra's al-Naqurah inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch shone a searchlight towards the aforementioned waters and Lebanese territorial waters.

On 13 September 2008:

- At 0400 hours, in the open sea off Ra's al-Naqurah inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch shone a searchlight towards the aforementioned waters and Lebanese territorial waters;

- At 2325 hours, in the open sea off the coast of Ra's al-Naqurah inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch shone a searchlight for two minutes towards Lebanese territorial waters.

On 14 September 2008, at 0115 hours, an Israeli enemy military launch shone a searchlight for one minute towards Lebanese territorial waters.

Acts of aggression in the field

On 2 September 2008:

- Between 1800 and 1900 hours, Israeli enemy forces, from their position at Birkat al-Naqqar inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, fired a number of rounds towards the perimeter of the said position;

- Between 2240 and 2300 hours, Israeli enemy forces fired a number of rounds between their Birkat al-Naqqar and Radar positions inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.

On 3 September 2008, between 1615 and 1845 hours, the Israeli enemy fired several bursts of medium-machine-gun fire from its positions at Summaqah and Fashkul farm inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.

On 4 September 2008:

- At 0358 hours, the Israeli enemy, from its position at Labbunah, shone a searchlight for one minute over the Lebanese Army position at Labbunah and towards Lebanese territorial waters;

- At 2300 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a vehicle-mounted searchlight for 10 seconds towards the Lahlah position (Alma al-Sha'b).

On 6 September 2008, on the perimeter of point B33, west of Rumaysh, the Israeli enemy detained Jaryus Makhul, a Lebanese citizen. They accused him, along with three Israelis, of disposing of suspicious sacks and smuggling drugs. The Israeli enemy claims that, when he was detained, he was in possession of some drugs and a briefcase of cash.

On 7 September 2008, at 2010 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight three times, for 15 seconds each time, from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin-Jabal Balat triangle, and then once again, at 2130 hours, for two minutes.

On 8 September 2008, at 0005 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin triangle and the Tarbikha and Jabal Balat positions of the 6th Brigade of the Lebanese Army, as follows: for two minutes at 0005 hours; for one minute at 0105 hours; for three minutes at 0135 hours; for two minutes at 0252 hours; for one minute at 0305 hours; and for two minutes at 0345 hours.

On 10 September 2008:

The Israeli enemy shone a searchlight from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin triangle, as follows: for seven minutes at 0345 hours; for two minutes at 0415 hours; and for five minutes at 0420 hours;

- At 2135 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for approximately three minutes from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin-Ramiyah-Jabal Balat triangle.

On 11 September 2008, between 0340 and 0440 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight three times, for approximately two minutes each time, from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin-Ramiyah-Jabal Balat triangle.

On 13 September 2008, at 2030 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for one minute from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin triangle and the Tarbikha gate.

On 14 September 2008, at 2005 hours, the Israeli enemy shone a searchlight for two minutes from the Zar'it barracks towards the Marwahin triangle, and then once again for one minute at 2013 hours.